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ABSTRACT
This Article—the first half of a diptych that continues with Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right,
22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming April 2020)—draws on the insight that the position of women in society
is nowhere better reflected and constituted than in a nation’s personal status laws. Contemporary feminist and
constitutional scholars have devoted much attention to how the laws of marriage affect women’s status in society,
but they have largely ignored the potential for divorce to vindicate gender equality norms—and many have
overlooked recent political and legal developments that threaten to substantially restrict dissolution rights.
This diptych seeks to fill in the academic void in feminist and constitutional scholarship by developing the
constitutional argument for divorce as a gender equality right. Recognizing that there are competing conceptions
of what constitutional gender equality means, the thesis is that every interpretation of equal protection must
guarantee a right of unilateral, no-fault exit from matrimonial chains. This Article establishes the status of
marital freedom as a gender-equality right under various substantive visions of constitutional equality. The
subsequent Article, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
April 2020), establishes the status of marital freedom as a gender-equality right under a formal understanding
of constitutional equality.
To expose the gender-equality implications of divorce law, this diptych unearths the lineage and function of divorce
restrictions as gender-status regulation and outlines the gender-specific burdens they impose on women. It further
unveils contemporary attempts to restrict divorce as reflecting impermissible status-based judgments about women’s
capacities, roles, and destinies. All in all, this diptych concludes that divorce restrictions coerce women to perform
the work of wifehood without altering the conditions that continue to make such work a principal cause of their
subordination. This makes unilateral no-fault divorce a fundamental right for women attempting to navigate the
world as equals and an imperative for a constitutional system committed to disestablishing gender hierarchy.
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INTRODUCTION
The position of women in a society is nowhere better reflected than in a
nation’s personal status laws.1 Regrettably, the laws of marriage have long
served as among the chief vehicles for cultivating women’s social and
economic dependency on men, inculcating unequal gender roles, and
inflicting status-harm on women as a class. The laws of divorce—especially
the fault regime that has dominated marital dissolution laws for much of
American history—have likewise functioned to maintain gender hierarchy
and reify sex-role stereotypes. Even today, the egalitarian marriage is still
more a myth than reality.2 American women in the twenty-first century
routinely struggle against structural inequities in their marriages. This
inequity extends beyond the formal bounds of marriage. It permeates all
gender relations and, in doing so, impedes women’s progress towards full
citizenship stature.
Because of the role marriage has played in fostering both private
patriarchy—the control a husband exerts over his wife within a family
system3—and public patriarchy by impairing women’s position in society at
large,4 feminists have insisted that equality in education, politics, and the
workplace cannot be fully realized without corresponding changes in the
gender hierarchy of the marital family.5 Accordingly, many liberal feminists
1

2

3
4

5

See, e.g., Essam Fawzy, Muslim Personal Status Law in Egypt: The Current Situation and Possibilities of Reform
Through Internal Initiatives, in WOMEN’S RIGHTS & ISLAMIC FAMILY LAW: PERSPECTIVES ON
REFORM 27 (Lynn Welchman ed., 2004) (arguing that the unattainability of divorce for women in
Egypt “place[s] women in the position of accepting their inferior status”); Karin Carmit Yefet, The
Constitution and Female-Initiated Divorce in Pakistan: Western Liberalism in Islamic Garb, 34 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 553 (2011).
See, e.g., Amy L. Wax, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Market: Is There a Future for Egalitarian Marriage?,
84 VA. L. REV. 509 (1998) (concluding based on bargaining theory that the prospects for egalitarian
marriage, however narrowly defined, are dim); LINDA C. MCCLAIN, THE PLACE OF FAMILIES 146
(2006) (noting that marriage has not yet transformed to reflect altered gender roles).
Carol Brown, Mothers, Fathers and Children: From Private to Public Patriarchy, in WOMEN AND
REVOLUTION 239 (Lydia Sargent ed., 1981).
See, e.g., SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 134, 149 (1989) (noting that
the gendered marriage “radically limits” equality of opportunity for women, and that inequality
within marriage has deep ramifications for the material, psychological, physical, and intellectual
well-being of women).
Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 239, 248–49 (2001) (arguing
that feminists acknowledge that in order for women to act as full citizens in the public sphere, it is
necessary to transform the marital family); OKIN, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that justice within
marriage is a prerequisite to gaining equality in politics, at work, and in every other sphere).
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have advocated egalitarian marriage, which would “encourage and facilitate
the equal sharing by men and women of paid and unpaid work, of productive
and reproductive labor,”6 as a crucial step towards rectifying women’s
continued subordination and economic vulnerability.7 More radical feminist
theorists, led by Martha Fineman, have gone so far as to call for the abolition
of marriage altogether.8
Neither solution, however, is adequate. The first, egalitarian marriage,
is a practical impossibility for the foreseeable future; it would require
abolition of gender hierarchy where it is most entrenched.9 The second—
abolition of marriage—is misguided: it would deprive individuals and society
of the recognized benefits of marriage without guaranteeing women legal
protection against subordination in intimate relationships.10
Instead, this diptych develops a modest, yet essential, innovative legal
construct to counter marital inequality—a constitutional right to unilateral,
no-fault divorce. The substance of this right is not purely negative. Its
affirmative dimension is captured by the appellation “marital freedom.” The
right to marital freedom is imperative to combat marital subordination, one
that is derived from multiple interpretations of America’s constitutional

6
7

8

9

10

OKIN, supra note 4, at 171.
Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Legislative Constitutionalism and Section Five Power: Policentric
Interpretation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 112 YALE L.J. 1943, 1987 (2003) (noting that NOW’s
founding documents acknowledged that genuine social equality for women necessitates social
reorganization of the family so that “women’s participation in family relations would no longer
constitute an impediment to their participation in public life.”).
As Fineman maintains, insofar as society continues to assign responsibility for caretaking solely to
the nuclear family, women will continue to carry the lion’s share of domestic work and child care
responsibilities and women’s inequality therefore will persist both at home, within individual
marriages, and in the workforce and society at large. MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE
NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES
230–36 (1995).
See OKIN, supra note 4, at 116 (conceding that this solution is “a radical break not only from
prevailing patterns of behavior but also from widely, though not completely, shared understandings
in our society about the social meanings, institutions, and implications of sexual difference.”); Wax,
supra note 2, at 513 (concluding that while “egalitarian marriage is possible in some cases, it will be
the exception rather than the rule.”).
Wax, supra note 2, at 637 (“[E]ven if legal marriage were abolished, people would continue to
couple up . . . and to lose [relationship-specific] investments through sex-skewed opportunistic
defections under conditions that favor the strong at the expense of the weak . . . .”); Carolyn J.
Frantz & Hanoch Dagan, Properties of Marriage, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 75, 93 (2004) (“[P]eople will
continue to partner despite the lack of legal marriage, but will do so without the protections against
subordination that the law can provide.”).
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commitment to gender equality. Just as women are allowed to enter into
marriage and choose to conform to gendered marital arrangements that may
disadvantage them,11 this Article argues that women must enjoy a
concomitant constitutional right to extricate themselves from rigid, even
mandatory, societal and spousal expectations. To paraphrase Jack Balkin,
liberal divorce rights guarantee “choice under conditions of sex inequality”12
and therefore are integral to women’s equality.
For all their focus on the laws of marriage, contemporary feminist and
constitutional scholars have largely ignored the potential of divorce as a
gender equality right—and many have overlooked recent political and legal
developments that threaten to turn back the clock on dissolution rights. For
most of American history, divorce law, shaped by rigid Christian doctrine,
was expressly designed to make divorce difficult to achieve. It was faultbased, requiring one spouse to establish gross marital misconduct of the other
utilizing a list of narrowly defined transgressions; most commonly adultery,
desertion, and cruelty. Only in the 1970s did states overwhelmingly move to
eliminate fault regimes or supplement them with liberal no-fault grounds, like
“incompatibility,” “breakdown of marriage,” or “irreconcilable
differences.”13 This so-called divorce revolution has been widely considered
“the twentieth century’s most significant contribution to family law.”14
Ever since the start of the new millennium, however, legislation aimed at
eliminating or at least weakening unilateral no-fault divorce laws has
proliferated, with proposals for divorce-restrictive measures in over thirty
states.15 Now, American divorce law is on the brink of a troubling paradigm
11

12

13

14
15

An increasing number of women are giving up the altar out of concern about gender equality,
power within marriage, and domestic violence. See, e.g., Kathryn Edin, What Do Low-Income Single
Mothers Say About Marriage?, 47 SOC. PROBS. 112, 117–19, 130 (2000); Marcia Carlson, Sara
McLanahan & Paula England, Union Formation in Fragile Families, 41 DEMOGRAPHY 237, 255–57
(2004); MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 133, 141.
This is the term Jack Balkin employs to describe the abortion right, which this Article endeavors to
show applies with equal force to the right to divorce. See Jack Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies
Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 EMORY L.J. 843, 851 (2007).
JOHN DEWITT GREGORY ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FAMILY LAW § 8.01, at 238 (3d ed. 2005);
Kenneth Rigby, Report and Recommendation of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the House Civil Law and
Procedure Committee of the Louisiana Legislature Relative to the Reinstatement of Fault as a Prerequisite to a Divorce,
62 LA. L. REV. 561, 576–77 (2002).
Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law
in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2039 (2000).
THEODORA OOMS ET AL., BEYOND MARRIAGE LICENSES: EFFORTS IN STATES TO
STRENGTHEN MARRIAGE AND TWO-PARENT FAMILIES: A STATE-BY-STATE SNAPSHOT 10
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shift.16 Various statutory reform efforts have embraced a range of procedural
techniques to substantially stall or eliminate divorce: by mandating
counseling, lengthy waiting periods, and spousal consent requirements; by
exchanging no-fault for fault grounds; and even by restricting, or even
abolishing,17 the right of parents of minor children to marital exit.18 In a
prominent testament to the success of what is aptly called the “counterrevolution,”19 three states to date have adopted “covenant marriage”
legislation allowing couples to choose a form of marriage in which exit is
severely restricted.20
These divorce restrictions are unconstitutional violations of gender
equality because they have both the purpose and effect of turning back the
clock, not only on divorce rights but also on women’s roles and status in

16

17

18

19

20

(2004) (“Since the mid-1990s, every state has made at least one policy change or undertaken at least
one activity designed to promote marriage, strengthen two-parent families, or reduce divorce.”); see
also Nicholas H. Wolfinger, The Mixed Blessings of No-Fault Divorce, 4 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM.
ADVOC. 407, 412 (2005) (describing states’ efforts to curb divorce in the late 1990s and early 2000s).
See ASHTON APPLEWHITE, CUTTING LOOSE: WHY WOMEN WHO END THEIR MARRIAGES DO
SO WELL 65 (1997) (“a backlash against no-fault divorce is now in full swing”); J. Herbie DiFonzo
& Ruth C. Stern, Addicted to Fault: Why Divorce Reform Has Lagged in New York, 27 PACE L. REV. 559,
593 (2007) (describing somewhat recent criticism of no-fault divorce schemes).
Judith T. Younger, Marital Regimes: A Story of Compromise and Demoralization, Together with Criticism and
Suggestions for Reform, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 45, 90–94 (1981) (introducing a proposal to restrict
divorce for those with children); Scott Maier, Breaking Up Is Harder to Do: Divorce Hits 21-Year Low,
PALM BEACH POST, Jan. 6, 1996, at 1D (citing sociologist Debra Friedman’s proposal to “ban[]
divorce when children are involved, except in extremely harmful situations . . . .”).
As Steven Nock predicted, “[s]ome type of divorce reform will probably exist in almost every state
in the next 10 to 15 years.” Mary Otto, ‘Save Marriage’ Push: Classes, Tougher Laws, SEATTLE TIMES,
Mar. 3, 1999, at A9 (internal quotation marks omitted); see Katherine Shaw Spaht, A Proposal: Legal
Re-Regulation of the Content of Marriage, 18 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 243, 259 (2004)
(“At the end of the twentieth century after suffering through the sexual revolution, the therapeutic
revolution, the feminist revolution, and the divorce revolution, a nascent counter-revolution aimed
at restoring traditional marriage has begun, both at the elite opinion level and at the grassroots
level.”).
Lynn D. Wardle, Divorce Reform at the Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q.
783, 794 (1999) (quoting Joel A. Nichols, Comment, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step
Toward a More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 930 (1998) (internal
citation omitted)); APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 65.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 9:272–75 (West 2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 to -906 (West
1998) (laying out a portion of a statutory scheme for covenant marriages); ARK. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9-11-803 (West 2001); see also Joel A. Nichols, Louisiana's Covenant Marriage Law: A First Step Toward
a More Robust Pluralism in Marriage and Divorce Law?, 47 EMORY L.J. 929, 974 (1998) (describing
several legislatures that considered covenant marriage laws). By the beginning of the twenty-first
century, a total of twenty state legislatures had considered covenant marriage proposals, see Amy L.
Stewart, Covenant Marriage: Legislating Family Values, 32 IND. L. REV. 509, 515 (1999).
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society. This diptych seeks to fill in the scholarly void by developing the
constitutional argument for marital freedom as both a substantive and formal
gender-equality right. This Article, the first of two, develops the substantive
gender-equality argument for the right to marital freedom, while its
companion21 develops the formal gender-equality argument.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I presents the constitutional
edifice of gender equality. It begins with the Court’s conceptualization of the
Equal Protection Clause in formal terms, using the “antidiscrimination”
principle, which prohibits state action that overtly classifies citizens on the
basis of group membership or that is ostensibly neutral but in fact motivated
by a discriminatory purpose. It then considers several competing,
substantive visions of constitutional equality, all of which concern group
status inequality, even when no facial classifications are drawn. Most
prominent among these theories is the “anti-subordination” principle, which
has been explicitly endorsed by the Supreme Court’s dissenters and
academic critics. But anti-subordination has recently been implicitly
adopted by the Supreme Court in a variety of different guises. In particular,
there is an emerging jurisprudence of gender equality/human dignity that
straddles the divide between equal protection and substantive due process.
Part II applies the substantive theories of gender equality to the divorce
context. It analyzes how laws that effectively compel wifehood by limiting
exit injure women, showing that state action is implicated even when a
husband’s subordination of his wife appears to be “private.” First, it opens
with a historical account, examining how the common law of marital status
fostered the unequal position of women in marriage, how divorce restrictions
served to lock women in patriarchal relationships, and how leading feminists
of the era recognized the right to divorce as a substantive gender equality
imperative. Second, it documents the inequalities that plague modern
marriages and continue to compromise women’s full citizenship, considering
sociological evidence on the division of household labor, women’s lesser
economic power and decision-making authority, and their heightened
physical vulnerability. Third, it analyzes women’s divorce accounts to
establish that most women who seek marital freedom do so to escape
inegalitarian relationships they find demeaning and to expose divorce as an

21

Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
April 2020).
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experience that enhances women’s independence and capacities for selfgovernance.
The law not only exacerbates gender inequality by locking women into
relationships of social and economic dependency; Part III will show that it
also plays an active role in maintaining gender inequality between husbands
and wives once women have been “locked into” such relationships. It
concludes that the right to marital freedom is an important antisubordination remedy that substantially enhances women’s control over their
own lives, and over their status more generally as equal citizens.
This Article’s companion, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right,22 will
construct a constitutional argument for marital freedom under the Supreme
Court’s formal antidiscrimination-oriented Equal Protection Clause
jurisprudence. First, it will show that divorce-restrictive regulations were
historically animated by discriminatory purposes and that fault grounds to
this day are judicially applied in ways that raise equal-protection concerns.
Second, it will show that the contemporary movement to restrict divorce
repeats history: its impetus is to shore up the traditional family structure
based on constitutionally proscribed views that subordinate women to the
roles of wives and mothers.
The cultural, structural, and legal forces that contribute to women’s
inequality—and produce the need for a right to marital freedom—are broad
and deep. Divorce rights, of course, are not sufficient in and of themselves
to stem these forces and secure gender equality in marriage and society. Yet
marital freedom is an indispensable step towards achieving gender equality
and human dignity for women and families in twenty-first century America.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL VISIONS OF GENDER EQUALITY: FORMAL VERSUS
SUBSTANTIVE UNDERSTANDINGS
As befits “the most complex of constitutional guarantees,”23 gender
equality has spurred a medley of analytical frameworks, both formal and
substantive in nature. This Part sketches the gender-equality theories that
will buttress discussion of the divorce right.

22
23

Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
April 2020).
Robert A. Sedler, The Settled Nature of American Constitutional Law, 48 WAYNE L. REV. 173, 247 (2002).
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A. Formal Gender Equality: The Antidiscrimination Principle
Grounded in the experiences with slavery and racial segregation, the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been
traditionally understood to guard against the false theory of racial difference
and black inferiority.24 Accordingly, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has
long stressed the principle of color-blindness or “antidiscrimination” as the
mediating principle at the core of equal protection.25 By virtue of this
principle, also called the “anti-classification” or “anti-differentiation”
principle, state classifications on “suspect” bases are invalid unless they satisfy
the constitutional touchstones of strict scrutiny.26 Where a law creates no
express classifications but still has a disparate impact on a suspect group, the

24

25

26

See, e.g., Robin West, Toward an Abolitionist Interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, 94 W. VA. L. REV.
111, 111–12 (1991) (“[T]he central meaning of the equal protection clause, and indeed of the
Fourteenth Amendment in its entirety, is that the law must be colorblind.”).
See Paul Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Antidiscrimination Principle, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1, 7 (1976) (“The
antidiscrimination principle fills a special need because . . . race-dependent decisions that are
rational and purport to be based solely on legitimate considerations are likely in fact to rest on
assumptions of the differential worth of racial groups or on the related phenomenon of racially
selective sympathy and indifference.”); Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: Sex, Race, And Equal
Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1004–06 (1986) (explaining that the “anti-differentiation”
principle underlies heightened scrutiny models and demands “equal treatment”); Owen M. Fiss,
Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 108 (1976) (emphasizing that the
“antidiscrimination principle” is a “mediating principle” that bridges the facial ambiguity of the
text of the Equal Protection Clause and the judicially-crafted meaning contained therein).
Classifications based on race, national origin, and alienage have all been considered “suspect”
classes deserving of strict scrutiny, the strictest level of judicial review. See Foley v. Connelie, 435
U.S. 291, 295–96 (1978) (noting that prior cases that involved state discrimination against “aliens
as a class” prompted “close scrutiny” but declining to adopt a bright-line rule); San Antonio Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (noting “traditional indicia of suspectness” that might
warrant heightened scrutiny as a class “saddled with such disabilities, or subjected to such a history
of purposeful unequal treatment, or relegated to such a history of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”); Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (“Aliens as a class are a prime example of a ‘discrete and
insular’ minority . . . for whom . . . heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate.”) (quoting United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11
(1967) (“At the very least, the Equal Protection Clause demands that racial classifications . . . be
subjected to the ‘most rigid scrutiny’ . . . .”) (quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,
216 (1944)); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 646 (1948) (explaining that “only the most
exceptional circumstances can excuse discrimination” based on “racial descent”).
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Supreme Court finds discrimination only if the state acted with
discriminatory intent in enacting the facially neutral law.27
Given the racial context of the Equal Protection Clause, how does it apply
to laws that create sex-based classifications or that use sex-neutral terms but
have a gendered impact? For the first hundred years of the Fourteenth
Amendment’s life, the Supreme Court routinely upheld legislation that
relegated women to secondary status, in opinions replete with separatespheres discourse affirming distinct roles for men and women in American
society.28 Only since the 1970s has the Court acknowledged that the Equal
Protection Clause is relevant to questions of gender justice.29 The Court
developed its gender-equality doctrine in an ahistorical manner by analogy
to its race-equality doctrine,30 establishing a “de facto ERA”31 that judges
sex-based classifications using a new level of intermediate scrutiny.32 To be
upheld, sex-based classifications must be substantially related to an important
government objective.33
27

28

29

30

31

32

33

See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 241, 246 (1976) (requiring challengers of facially
neutral state action demonstrate that the challenged practice was animated by a discriminatory
purpose).
See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961) (upholding the automatic exclusion of women from
jury duty); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948) (upholding a prohibition on female bartenders);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding limitations on the hours worked by women).
See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–77 (1971) (the first Supreme Court decision to invalidate a
gender classification; using the rational basis test to invalidate a preference for males over females
as executors of wills).
Justice Brennan was the first to make this argument. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677,
682–88 (1973) (concluding that sex-based discrimination is akin to race discrimination in that it is
based on historical stereotypes and “immutable characteristics” wholly unrelated to one’s ability to
“contribute to society”) (plurality opinion).
Reva B. Siegel, Constitutional Culture, Social Movement Conflict and Constitutional Change: The Case of the De
Facto ERA, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1323, 1324 (2006) (quoting Michael C. Dorf, Equal Protection
Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 985 (2002)).
See United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 531–58 (1996) (applying a form of intermediate
scrutiny requiring “exceedingly persuasive justification” and ultimately holding as unconstitutional
the Virginia Military Institute’s all-male admissions policy); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458
U.S. 718, 724–31, 733 (1982) (applying a form of intermediate scrutiny that examined motivating
biases and stereotypes; holding a state-sponsored all-female nursing school unconstitutional, in part
because it was based on stereotypes about gender in nursing); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197–
204, 210 (1976) (applying intermediate scrutiny to invalidate a statute prohibiting the sale of beer
to underage males only); Weinberger v. Weisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 643, 653 (1975) (applying a
heightened standard of scrutiny to invalidate a provision of the Social Security Act giving survivor
benefits to females only).
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533 (quoting Hogan, 458 U.S. at 724). Some suggest that the VMI case
introduced “skeptical scrutiny” to sex-based discrimination, which “differs from strict scrutiny only
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Further, any justification for sex-based classifications must not be based
on gender-role stereotypes.34 In a long line of equal-protection cases, the
Court invalidated gender classifications in family law because they reflected
sexual stereotypes of the separate-spheres tradition that presume, on the one
hand, breadwinning husbands, and on the other, domesticated wives focused
on home and married life.35 The Court indicated that the traditional and
even settled beliefs about women’s proper gender roles in the family and in
society, far from vindicating discrimination, are now a barometer of
constitutional invalidity.36
The Court has thus understood “antistereotyping” to be a central aspect of gender equal protection.37
While the Court subjects overt sex-based classifications to heightened
scrutiny, in the context of sex it has also adopted a stringent discriminatory
intent requirement for laws that do not discriminate on their face. In Feeney,
the Court held that facially neutral state action that has an adverse impact
on women does not violate equal protection unless it was selected or

34

35

36

37

in name.” Anita K. Blair, Constitutional Equal Protection, Strict Scrutiny, and the Politics of Marriage Law,
47 CATH. U. L. REV. 1231, 1233–35 (1998); see also DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, THE CASE FOR GAY
RIGHTS: FROM BOWERS TO LAWRENCE AND BEYOND 62 (2005) (positing that “the Supreme
Court may be raising the level of scrutiny for gender much closer to that of race” after VMI).
See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T. B., 511 U.S. 127, 141–42, 146 (1994) (holding that gender-based
peremptory challenges violate the Equal Protection Clause, particularly where the discrimination
is informed by gender stereotypes).
See Hogan, 458 U.S. at 725–26, 726 n.14 (noting the “broad range of statutes already invalidated by
[the] Court” that were based on “simplistic, outdated assumption[s]” about gender); see, e.g., Orr
v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979) (invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause a state law provision based on gender stereotypes regarding financial need, that accorded
ex-wives but not ex-husbands the right to receive alimony); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199
(1977) (invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause a statute, based
on gender stereotypes regarding financial need, that required widowers—but not widows—prove
dependency on their deceased spouses in order to receive OASDI benefits).
See e.g., Orr, 440 U.S. at 283 (“Where . . . the State’s . . . purposes are as well served by a genderneutral classification as one that gender classifies and therefore carries with it the baggage of sexual
stereotypes, the State cannot be permitted to classify on the basis of sex.”); Craig, 429 U.S. at 198–
99 (holding impermissible the “increasingly outdated misconceptions concerning the role of females
in the home rather than in ‘the marketplace and world of ideas’”) (quoting Stanton v. Stanton, 421
U.S. 7, 15 (1975)).
The Supreme Court has consistently held that state laws and practices reflecting stereotypical
assumptions about women’s proper roles are invalid under the Equal Protection Clause. See David
H. Gans, Stereotyping and Difference: Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the Future of Sex Discrimination
Law, 104 YALE L.J. 1875, 1881, 1897 (1995) (noting the centrality of stereotyping analysis to
modern sex discrimination law under the Equal Protection Clause).

466

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:2

reaffirmed “at least in part ‘because of,’ not merely ‘in spite of,’ its adverse
effects upon an identifiable group.”38
In sum, the Court’s gender-equality jurisprudence, modeled after its raceequality paradigm, sounds in formalistic antidiscrimination norms by
focusing on the purpose and structure of challenged legislation, not on its
impact, to ensure that state actors are not motivated by stereotypical
judgments about women.39 This formalist understanding will be discussed in
greater detail by Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right.40
Recognizing that the Supreme Court equates discrimination with
classification, regulatory bodies have wiped out traditional forms of genderstatus legislation and generally avoided justifying facially neutral regulations
using discredited status-based reasoning.41 As a result, laws today are almost
universally facially neutral and rationalized in non-discriminatory rhetoric,
yet many still perpetuate, even aggravate, racial and gender stratification.42
Thus, for example, absent evidence that state action was animated by a
discriminatory purpose, many of the most oppressive marital status doctrines
of the common law—which were originally couched or recently have been
redefined in facially neutral terms—now survive equal-protection scrutiny.43
The Supreme Court, however, has failed to modernize its equalprotection doctrine to rout out bias in such ostensibly neutral state action.44

38
39

40
41

42

43
44

Personnel Admin. of Mass. v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279 (1979).
See Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 270 (1993) (rejecting the proposition
that “class-based animus can be determined solely by effect.”); cf. Robin West, Equality Theory,
Marital Rape, and the Promise of the Fourteenth Amendment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 45, 61 n.66 (1990) (noting
that a problem with anti-subordination approaches to Equal Protection Clause is that courts have
rejected them).
Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
April 2020).
As Reva Siegel has explained, just as the conflicts culminating in the disestablishment of slavery
and later segregation produced a shift in the justificatory rhetoric of racial status laws, the
discriminatory purpose doctrine has caused a shift in the forms of state action that perpetuate the
gender stratification of American society. Reva Siegel, Why Equal Protection No Longer Protects, 49
STAN. L. REV. 1111, 1119–29 (1997).
Id. at 1111, 1131 (demonstrating that the Court’s current interpretation of equal protection
“continues to authorize forms of state action that contribute to the racial and gender stratification
of American society.”).
Reva B. Siegel, She the People: The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115
HARV. L. REV. 947, 1024–26 (2002).
Siegel, supra note 41, at 1141–42. For an egregious example, see Unites States v. Clary, 34 F.3d 709
(8th Cir. 1994) (upholding sentencing guidelines that treated the possession of a given amount of
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Progressive constitutional commentators have thus fiercely attacked the
discriminatory intent rule as outmoded in the wake of the disestablishment
of overt forms of race and gender classification,45 calling for a new paradigm
that would allow equal protection to meaningfully target the contemporary
forms of subordination of protected groups.46
B. A Substantive Understanding of Gender Equality
The legal literature abounds with proposals to either modify or abrogate
the discriminatory purpose rule.47 In what follows, this Section considers
scholarly proposals to analyze facially neutral legislation in accordance with
an anti-subordination principle48 and to inform equal protection analysis
based on its historical context.49 Each of these approaches addresses the
conceptual problems that plague the gender-discrimination paradigm in a
way that is connected to constitutional text, history, or doctrine. It concludes
by exploring the emergent doctrine of “due process equality,” a development
in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence that infuses due process analysis with
substantive equality concerns.
1. The Anti-Subordination Principle
Prominent constitutional critics and dissenting justices have long called
for making the substantive value of equality the mediating principle of equalprotection jurisprudence. The principle now widely known as “anti-

45

46
47

48
49

crack cocaine equally to 100 times that amount of powder cocaine, even though over ninety percent
of defendants possessing crack cocaine were blacks).
See, e.g., David Kairys, More or Less Equal, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 675, 677 (2004); Carlos A.
Singer, The Stultification of the Fourteenth Amendment, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 875, 882–83
(2004); Siegel, supra note 41, at 1135–46; Theodore Eisenberg & Sheri Lynn Johnson, The Effects of
Intent: Do We Know How Legal Standards Work?, 76 CORNELL L. REV. 1151, 1166 (1991).
Siegel, supra note 41, at 1144.
See, e.g., David A. Strauss, Discriminatory Intent and the Taming of Brown, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 935, 945
(1989) (arguing that the discriminatory purpose standard should be based on a showing of
impartiality in governmental decision making); Randall L. Kennedy, McClesky v. Kemp: Race,
Capital Punishment, and the Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1388, 1419–21, 1424–29 (1988); Sylvia
A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1005–13 (1984).
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1514–21 ¶¶ 16–21 (2d ed.
1988).
Siegel, supra note 41, at 1141–45. See generally Siegel, supra note 43.
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subordination”50 dominates the equality literature.51 Anti-subordinationists
argue that this approach is more faithful than the Supreme Court’s
antidiscrimination principle to the American constitutional tradition and the
civil rights struggle, pointing out that equal protection developed to remedy
a history of subordination, not just mere classification, against blacks.52
Accordingly, the anti-subordination principle is less concerned about the
hidden prejudices of state actors than about the inequalities in group status
and the social stratification that state action inflicts on disadvantaged groups;
the persistent reality of unconscious bias makes it essential to have equality
standards that address policies that, while neutral on their face, are
discriminatory in effect.53
To achieve its purpose of disestablishing entrenched forms of groupbased subordination and securing substantive equality, the antisubordination understanding of equal protection condemns laws and
practices that have the effect of creating, perpetuating, or aggravating the
second-class citizenship of historically oppressed groups.54 For example,
50
51

52

53

54

See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, What Is Feminism?, 26 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 413, 416–17 (1994) (discussing the
centrality of the anti-subordination principle in modern feminist thought); Colker, supra note 25.
This principle is termed the “group-disadvantaging principle” by Owen Fiss—Fiss, supra note 25,
at 157—the “antisubjugation principle” by Laurence Tribe—TRIBE, supra note 48, at 1515–16—
and the “equal citizenship” or “anticaste” principle by Cass Sunstein, Kenneth Karst, and Charles
Lawrence. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, The American Civil Rights Tradition: Anticlassification or
Antisubordination?, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 9, 9 n.2 (2003).
Anti-subordinationists persuasively demonstrate that the Equal Protection Clause was “drafted
specifically”—TRIBE, supra note 48, at 1516—to remedy the very evil of subjugation by overturning
the status of blacks as “a subordinate and inferior class of beings, who had been subjugated by the
dominant race.” Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 404–405 (1856). See also JACOBUS
TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 192–95 (Univ.
Cal. Press & Cambridge Univ. Press, 1951) (noting that the Equal Protection Clause empowered
Congress to “legislate upon all matters pertaining to the life, liberty, and property of all of the
inhabitants of the several states.”); West, supra note 24, at 112.
See Sylvia A. Law, Where Do We Go from Here? The Fourteenth Amendment, Original Intent, and Present
Realities, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 691, 697–98 (2004) (arguing that since unconscious sexism
is “pervasive and often invisible,” constitutional concern about equality “should pay attention to
effects.”); Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, But Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the Requirement of
Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 980–81 (1993) (arguing that the intent requirement
ignores the existence of white race consciousness).
See Fiss, supra note 25, at 157 (noting that the Equal Protection Clause prohibits a law or official
practice that “aggravates (or perpetuates?) the subordinate position of a specially disadvantaged
group.”); Owen Fiss, Another Equality, in ISSUES IN LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP, THE ORIGINS AND FATE
OF ANTISUBORDINATION THEORY 3–4 (Caranjit Singh ed., 2004) (explaining that under the antisubordination principle, certain social practices should be condemned because they “perpetuate
the subordination of the group of which the individual excluded or rejected is a member.”).
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unlike antidiscrimination, the anti-subordination principle does not require
proof of individualized motivation and permits consideration of the groupbased effects of an action. By disavowing all policies—whether facially
differentiating or facially neutral—that disproportionately harm members of
marginalized groups, unless justified by a weighty public purpose,55 antisubordination “can tell the difference between benign and invidious
discrimination.”56
There are several Supreme Court decisions that reflect the antisubordination principle, drawing on concepts of social status or caste to
interpret equal protection.57 As shown by Jack Balkin and Reva Siegel, antisubordination values often have guided the application of the
antidiscrimination principle in practice.58 In Mississippi University for Women v.
Hogan, for example, the Court invalidated the state nursing school’s womenonly admission policy on the grounds that it “reflect[ed] archaic and
stereotypic notions” of “proper” gender roles, thereby perpetuating the
relegation of women to inferior status.59 The antidiscrimination principle
alone could not well account for the Hogan decision, as Laurence Tribe
correctly observes, since the Court faulted the single-sex admission policy not
only because it discriminated against men, but more so because it reinforced
the subjugation of women.60
United States v. Virginia, to take a more recent illustration, similarly infuses
the Court’s antidiscrimination framework with anti-subordination

55

56
57

58

59
60

For example, the goal of redressing subordination could justify a sex-specific affirmative action. For
such anti-subordinationist scholars as Ruth Colker, the goal of anti-subordination is the only
justification that is permitted to justify a race- or sex-specific policy or action. Colker, supra note
25, at 1015.
Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of Decision in Race Equality
Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1288–89 (2011).
For example, in Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), the first equal-protection case to reach
the Court after the Civil War, a unanimous Court viewed equal protection as an “exemption from
legal discriminations, implying inferiority,” which are “steps towards reducing [blacks] to the
condition of a subject race.” Id. at 308.
See generally Balkin & Siegel, supra note 51 (arguing that many of the Court’s equal-protection cases
explicitly or implicitly vindicate anti-subordination norms within the discourse of antidiscrimination); see also Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in
Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1470, 1542–43 (2004) (“[C]oncerns of
subordination shape the concept of classification itself.”).
Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 725, 726 (1981).
TRIBE, supra note 48, at 1518.
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concerns.61 Recognizing that equal-protection norms guarantee women the
full stature of citizenship, not simply the right to individual consideration, the
Court deemed the male-only admission policy to Virginia Military Institute
a constitutional wrong for demeaning women and perpetuating their
inferiority as a group.62
2. Historical Foundations for Substantive Gender-Equality Jurisprudence
The reviewed anti-subordination scholarship developed largely in
response to the judicial focus on antidiscrimination as the central theme of
constitutional equality. This Subsection explores several historically
grounded theories of substantive gender equality that developed in response
to the Supreme Court’s ahistorical reliance on the racial-discrimination
paradigm to guide its gender-equality jurisprudence. Informed directly by
struggles with gender oppression, each approach canvassed below represents
a particular vision of substantive equality that is narrowly focused on gender.
Lucinda Finely, for one, argues that in order to conceptualize gender
equality in a way more faithful to the Equal Protection Clause’s history and
ideals, we should concentrate not on the racial classification cases originating
in the civil rights movement, but on nineteenth century women’s rights
activists and their understanding of how the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment could apply to practices that subordinate women.63 For the
nineteenth century movement for women’s rights, equal protection was not
based on formal equal treatment, but on a substantive model of equality.64
As the nineteenth century “founding mothers” conceived of gender equality,
“[if a] public act of state officials or a legal restriction or classification, or
private actions such as violence, or public indifference to private oppressions,
impairs women’s ability to enjoy all their human rights both equally and
fully, then the practice presents an equality problem.”65 These activists
widely accepted as constitutive of equal protection affirmative state

61
62
63
64
65

United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515 (1996).
Id. at 534 (“[Sex] classifications may not be used, as they once were . . . to create or perpetuate the
legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”).
Lucinda M. Finley, Putting “Protection” Back in the Equal Protection Clause: Lessons from Nineteenth Century
Women’s Rights Activists’ Understandings of Equality, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 429 (2004).
Id. at 432–33.
Id. at 452.
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obligations to protect citizens from private violence and to guarantee familial
rights.66
Robin West, for another, has argued that the Equal Protection Clause
must be understood in light of the abolitionist history surrounding its
adoption. For her, an abolitionist understanding of gender equality is more
faithful to both the text and history of the Fourteenth Amendment than
either the formal antidiscrimination or the substantive anti-subordination
views of equal protection.67 She understands the Equal Protection Clause as
a guarantee of “sole state sovereignty,” a right not to be subjugated to the
whims of a sovereign other than the state and a protection against potentially
subordinating or enslaving conditions like private violence or economic
dependence that leave citizens profoundly unequal.68 Under West’s
abolitionist interpretation, the Equal Protection Clause is “a charter
protecting our right to be self-governing, autonomous, free of other rulers,
masters, or superiors, within the confines of the rule of law.”69
Reva Siegel and Akhil Amar offer a synthetic reading of the Fourteenth
and Nineteenth Amendments, grounding gender discrimination doctrine in
the history and normative concerns that prompted the passage of the suffrage
amendment.70 In the debates over women’s suffrage that began with the
drafting of the Fourteenth Amendment and concluded with the ratification
of the Nineteenth Amendment, the battle over women’s right to vote
centered on marriage.71 Antisuffragists conceived of the female franchise as
anathematic to the patriarchal family structure and the associated commonlaw notions of virtual representation and marital unity.72 Suffragists,
66
67
68
69
70

71

72

Id. at 448–49.
West, supra note 24, at 113, 137.
Id. at 130, 138–39, 143–44 (noting that equal protection “targets states’ refusal to protect citizens
against profoundly private action which results in insubordination or enslavement . . . .”).
Id. at 139, 149.
Siegel, supra note 43, at 959–60; see also Akhil Reed Amar, Concurring and Dissenting, in WHAT ROE V.
WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID 152, 162–63 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2005) (advocating reading the
Fourteenth Amendment in light of the Nineteenth Amendment, which produces a robust reading
of women’s equal protection and equal citizenship).
See generally Siegel, supra note 43, at 952, 981 (showing that suffragists and antisuffragists alike
anticipated that enfranchising women would free women from laws and institutions that restricted
their roles in marriage and the market).
Under this view of marriage, enfranchising women was perceived as both unnecessary and harmful.
It was believed to be unnecessary in that men were understood as heads of household authorized
to represent their wives and other dependents in public and private law. Id. at 981–87; see, e.g.,
CONG. GLOBE, 40th Cong., 2d Sess. 1956 (1868) (noting that women and children should be
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meanwhile, continuously challenged the common-law doctrines of marital
status and viewed the demand for the vote as a challenge to the very order of
coverture.73 Ultimately, the suffragists had the better of the debate. Indeed,
in the immediate aftermath of the Nineteenth Amendment’s ratification,
both the Supreme Court and Congress interpreted the amendment in light
of the suffrage debates as a constitutional commitment to break from
patriarchal understandings of the family and from common-law traditions of
marital status.74
A synthetic construal of the Fourteenth and Nineteenth Amendments
thus calls for a robust reading of women’s equal protection and equal
citizenship rights.75 Whereas the Court’s formalist equal-protection
jurisprudence fails to give special attention to the way the state has regulated
women’s social position in and through the family, grounding genderequality doctrine in the history of the women’s struggle for citizenship rights
teaches that at the core of gender equality is freedom from subordination in
or through the family.76 This sociohistorical understanding of genderequality doctrine would thus accord heightened scrutiny not only to sexbased classifications, but also to ostensibly neutral state action regulating
family life in a way that denies women “full citizenship stature” or that
perpetuates the “legal, social, and economic inferiority of women.”77

73
74

75
76

77

represented by “someone who by reason of domestic or social relations . . . can be fairly said to
represent [their] interests.”).
Siegel, supra note 43, at 977–97.
For example, in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), the Court invalidated a sex-based
minimum wage law based on the sex equality norm enshrined in the Nineteenth Amendment,
discussing equality for women in the framework of the suffrage debates and understanding it as
emancipation from reasoning about women’s roles rooted in the common law of marital status. Id.
at 553; see also Siegel, supra note 43, at 1012, 1015–19 (discussing the rulings of several federal and
state courts that invoked the Nineteenth Amendment as a reason to repudiate or narrowly interpret
coverture concepts). In recent years, however, courts have dissociated the suffrage amendment
from the debates that surrounded its ratification, such that today the Nineteenth Amendment is
commonly understood as limited to the context of voting. Id. at 1021–22.
Amar, supra note 70, at 162.
By adopting the Nineteenth Amendment, Americans repudiated patriarchal conceptions of the
family that were rooted in coverture and the common-law traditions that subordinated women to
men in marriage, understanding the Amendment to augur a shift in gender roles and family
structure. See Siegel, supra note 43, at 953, 1007, 1034 (“constitutional guarantees of equal
citizenship would protect women against regulation that perpetuates traditional understandings of
the family that are inconsistent with equal citizenship in a democratic polity.”).
Id. at 1044 (quoting United States v. Virginia (VMI), 518 U.S. 515, 533–534 (1996)).
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3. “Due Process Equality”: Substantive Protection for Equal Citizenship and
Human Dignity
A gender-equality approach to marital freedom does not solely depend
on the authority of the Equal Protection Clause. One of the most significant
developments in fundamental rights jurisprudence in recent years is the
grafting of liberty, equality, and dignity norms into substantive due process.78
Several constitutional commentators have begun to call attention to “the
ways in which equal citizenship’s antisubordination values” have
“profoundly influenced the doctrinal growth of substantive due process,”
commencing in Griswold and culminating in Lawrence79 and Obergefell.80 While
many canonical fundamental rights decisions are inflected with equality
concerns,81 the reproductive freedom cases in particular highlight this trend
of what this Article terms “due process equality.”
Owen Fiss, along with an impressive line of thinkers,82 has found that the
seminal abortion case—Roe v. Wade—“makes constitutional sense only if we
bring to the fore an understanding of the significance of the right to choose
abortion for the social position of women: as a means of furthering their
equality.”83 Indeed, the Roe majority’s reasoning that “[m]aternity, or

78

79
80
81

82

83

See, e.g., Laurence H. Tribe, Lawrence v. Texas: The “Fundamental Right” that Dare Not Speak Its Name,
117 HARV. L. REV. 1893, 1898 (2004) (“[D]ue process and equal protection, far from having
separate missions and entailing different inquiries, are profoundly interlocked in a legal double
helix. It is a single, unfolding tale of equal liberty and increasingly universal dignity.”). Kenji
Yoshino refers to the links between equality and liberty as “dignity” claims. See Kenji Yoshino, The
New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 748–49 (2011); see also id. at 776–83 (describing the
judicial move toward “liberty-based dignity”).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal Citizens: Groups and
the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. Rev. 99, 102 (2007).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), considered
the “true progenitors” of substantive due process doctrine, have been understood to have equality
dimensions, protecting national minorities and religious minorities, respectively. See United States
v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938) (citing Pierce as relevant for religious
minorities, and Meyer as relevant for national minorities).
See, e.g., KENNETH L. KARST, LAW’S PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION: VISIONS OF POWER IN THE
POLITICS OF RACE, GENDER, AND RELIGION 53, 183 (1993) (“The Griswold and Roe decisions are
most satisfactorily defended as effectuating the principle of equal citizenship.”).
Fiss, supra note 50, at 416. For the rewriting of Roe as a sex equality decision, see generally WHAT
ROE V. WADE SHOULD HAVE SAID, supra note 70. For a discussion of the evolution of equalitybased arguments for the abortion right, see Reva B. Siegel, Sex Equality Arguments for Reproductive
Rights: Their Critical Basis and Evolving Constitutional Expression, 56 EMORY L.J. 815 (2007) (noting that
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additional offspring, may force upon the woman a distressful life and
future”84 led the dissent to observe that the majority was importing “legal
considerations associated with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment to this case arising under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.”85 Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists likewise invoked a gender-equality rationale for the right to
reproductive freedom,86 suggesting that abortion regulations “[implicate]
constitutional values of equality as well as privacy.”87
Planned Parenthood v. Casey expressly imported equality themes into its
fundamental-rights jurisprudence, recognizing explicitly what had been
implicit in Roe: “that a constitutional right of due process liberty can rest
comfortably on grounds sounding in equality.”88 Though situating its
equality analysis in a discussion of due process liberty rather than equal
protection,89 the joint opinion “manifestly and repeatedly declares its
condemnation of women’s status subordination,”90 acknowledging the
importance of the abortion decision in guaranteeing women full
participation in society and denouncing abortion-restrictive regulations as
premised on a narrow vision of women’s customary family roles.91 In

84
85
86

87
88
89

90
91

a sex equality standpoint on reproductive rights can be, and is, expressed in a variety of
constitutional frameworks).
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
Id. at 173 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 925 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part) (“The Constitution protects all individuals, male or female, married or
unmarried, from the abuse of governmental power . . . .”); see also Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772 (1986) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Our cases long
have recognized that the Constitution embodies a promise that a certain private sphere of
individual liberty will be kept largely beyond the reach of the government. . . . That promise
extends to women as well as to men.”).
Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal
Protection, 44 STAN. L. REV. 261, 263 (1992).
Kenneth L. Karst, Constitutional Equality as a Cultural Form: The Courts and the Meaning of Sex and Gender,
38 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 513, 534 (2003).
Only Justice Blackmun located his argument within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(arguing that abortion restrictions resting on the assumption that motherhood is women’s “natural”
role in society implicates the Equal Protection Clause).
Karst, supra note 79, at 129.
Casey, 505 U.S. at 856 (“The ability of women to participate equally in the economic and social life
of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their reproductive lives.”); id. at 912
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“Roe is an integral part of a correct
understanding of both the concept of liberty and the basic equality of men and women.”); id. at 928
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addition, the opinion invoked dignitary concerns,92 structuring a novel undue
burden test to demand respect for the dignity of women that equals respect
shown for the dignity of fetal life.93 Many constitutional scholars accordingly
read Casey to vindicate not only a right grounded in equality values alone,
but also a right to dignity.94
More recently, in Stenberg v. Carhart, the Court further infused its
substantive due process liberty analysis with equality and dignity concerns:
“millions [of Americans] fear that a law that forbids abortion would
condemn many American women to lives that lack dignity, depriving them
of equal liberty and leading those with least resources to undergo illegal
abortions with the attendant risks of death and suffering.”95 Finally, Justice
Ginsburg’s dissent in Gonzales v. Carhart brought equal-protection analysis to

92
93

94

95

(Blackmun J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A State’s restrictions on a woman’s right
to terminate her pregnancy also implicate constitutional guarantees of gender equality.”). As Justice
Ginsburg put it, Casey “acknowledged the intimate connection between a woman’s ‘ability to control
[her] reproductive life’ and her ‘ability . . . to participate equally in the economic and social life of
the Nation.’” See Nomination of Ruth Bader Ginsburg to be Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S.:
Hearings Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 103, 205–08 (1993); Ruth Bader Ginsburg,
Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade, 63 N.C. L. REV. 375, 386 (1985);
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Speaking in a Judicial Voice, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (1992). But see
Eugene Volokh, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experimental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120
HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1826 n.66 (2007) (arguing that sex equality “is not the justification that the
Court has generally given for the abortion right”).
Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
See id. at 851, 876 (asserting that the best method of balancing the state’s interest in fetal life and a
woman’s interest in personal autonomy would be to impose an undue burden test in evaluating the
constitutionality of abortion regulations); see also Reva B. Siegel, Dignity and the Politics of Protection:
Abortion Restrictions Under Casey/Carhart, 117 YALE L.J. 1694, 1696 (2008) (arguing that a
commitment to both the dignity of human life and the dignity of women underlies the Court’s
undue burden formulation in its Casey and Carhart decisions).
See Siegel, supra note 83, at 833–34 (internal citations omitted) (reviewing commentary concerning
liberty and equality values at stake in the Court’s reasoning and situating Casey in the doctrinally
evolving due process equality reasoning in support of the right to abort); see also Siegel, supra note
93, at 1696 (“Carhart appeals to human dignity as a reason to allow government to restrict abortion,
while Casey appeals to human dignity as a reason to prohibit government from interfering with a
woman's decision whether to become a parent.”); Reva B. Siegel, The New Politics of Abortion: An
Equality Analysis of Woman-Protective Abortion Restrictions, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 991, 1050–53 (2007)
(analyzing the intertwining of liberty and equality values in Casey); Reva B. Siegel, Abortion as a Sex
Equality Right: Its Basis in Feminist Theory, in MOTHERS IN LAW: FEMINIST THEORY AND THE LEGAL
REGULATION OF MOTHERHOOD (Martha Albertson Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995); Reva
B. Siegel, “You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby”: Rehnquist’s New Approach to Pregnancy Discrimination in Hibbs,
58 STAN. L. REV. 1871, 1895–96 (2006).
530 U.S. 914, 920 (2000).
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the forefront of fundamental-rights jurisprudence.96 Joined by three other
justices, she concluded that the abortion right “center[s] on a woman’s
autonomy to determine her life’s course, and thus to enjoy equal citizenship
stature.”97
Even outside the abortion context, the Court has relied on equality and
dignitary concerns to inform its due process analysis. When guaranteeing
gay people the due process right to order their sexual lives, the Lawrence Court
stressed the respect, dignity, and equal social standing that individuals in our
society are owed.98 In Justice Kennedy’s terms, “[e]quality of treatment and
the due process right to demand respect for conduct protected by the
substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in important respects, and a
decision on the latter point advances both interests.”99 Denying homosexuals
the forms of autonomy accorded to heterosexuals was recognized as a
simultaneous affront to liberty, dignity, and equality and to the protections
against subordination that human dignity demands:
If protected conduct is made criminal and the law which does so remains
unexamined for its substantive validity, its stigma might remain even if it
were not enforceable as drawn for equal protection reasons. When
homosexual conduct is made criminal by the law of the State, that
declaration in and of itself is an invitation to subject homosexual persons to
discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres. The central
holding of Bowers . . . demeans the lives of homosexual persons.100

Lawrence was therefore deeply concerned about social subordination,
recognizing the essence of equal citizenship as the dignity of full membership
in society.101 Similarly, in the recent landmark Obergefell case, the Court
96

97
98

99
100
101

Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 185 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg did not
just draw upon sex equality principles to justify the abortion right, as in Casey, but she also directly
invoked equal protection cases to extend the constitutional repudiation of laws reflecting or
enforcing traditional sex-role stereotypes.
Id. at 172.
The Court repeatedly invokes the concept of individual dignity. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“[A]dults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the confines of their
homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.”); id. at 574 (discussing
“personal dignity and autonomy” and quoting Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (joint opinion of O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.)).
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 562–75.
Id.
Siegel, supra note 93, at 1704 (“[The Court] speaks passionately of the dignity of autonomous
decisionmaking, insisting that the Constitution guarantees an individual freedom to choose her own
life course and not to live as the instrument of another’s will. Justice Kennedy is eloquent also in
describing the protections against subordination that human dignity requires, declaring the
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further devoted considerable judicial energy to expounding the close ties
between the liberty of the Due Process Clause and the equality of the Equal
Protection Clause, stressing the interlocking nature of liberty and equality
that crystalizes a right to “equal dignity” in same-sex marriages.102
The intersection of principles of liberty, dignity, and equality under the
Due Process Clause is far less constraining than the Supreme Court’s equalprotection jurisprudence, which sounds in antidiscrimination norms and
focuses on the purpose and structure of challenged legislation rather than its
impact.103
“Due process equality,” to the contrary, stresses antisubordination norms, which respond to problems of social stratification,
press substantive measures of equal citizenship, and impugn dignitary
injuries of state action that enforce the subordinate status of relatively
powerless groups.104
Part I has demonstrated that gender equality is a constitutional mandate
protected under various jurisprudential and scholarly doctrinal frameworks.
Parts II and III consider marital freedom as a substantive gender-equality right
by applying the anti-subordination principle, historical interpretations of

102
103

104

Constitution guarantees persons freedom from the denigration and humiliation of treatment as
second-class citizens.”); see also Pamela S. Karlan, Foreword: Loving Lawrence, 102 MICH. L. REV.
1447, 1449 (2004) (“Lawrence is a case about liberty that has important implications for the
jurisprudence of equality . . . .”); Robert C. Post, Foreword: Fashioning the Legal Constitution: Culture,
Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 98 (2003) (“The perception that the Texas anti-sodomy
statute imposes second-class citizenship on an identifiable class of persons . . . is at the core of
Lawrence’s analysis.”).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602–04, 2608 (2015).
See Yoshino, supra note 78, at 781 (noting the function of due process equality as “an end run around
bars on disparate impact”); see also Rebecca L. Brown, Liberty, the New Equality, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1491, 1542 (2002) (arguing that the “fundamental rights strand of equal protection” analysis enables
the Court to look beyond facial neutrality and look to the real-world impact of the laws it analyzes);
Reva B. Siegel, Roe’s Roots: The Women’s Rights Claims That Engendered Roe, 90 B.U. L. REV. 1875,
1903 (2010) (stating that the due process analysis in Casey tied the “constitutional protection for
women’s abortion decision to the understanding . . . that the government cannot use law to enforce
traditional sex roles on women”).
Indeed, like the Equal Protection Clause, the Due Process Clause was designed at least in part to
“‘abolish[] all class legislation in the States and do[] away with the injustice of subjecting one caste
of persons to a code not applicable to another.” Balkin, supra note 12, at 852 (quoting CONG.
GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2764–68 (1866) (statement of Sen. Howard)).
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substantive equality, and the Supreme Court’s emerging doctrine of “due
process equality.”105
II. MARITAL FREEDOM AS A SUBSTANTIVE GENDER-EQUALITY RIGHT
To establish the link between the right to marital freedom and substantive
gender equality, this Part reveals the institution of marriage as a site of status
inequality, as it has been historically regulated and as it is currently
experienced by numerous women. This story, of subordination facilitated by
marriage laws and reinforced through divorce laws, demands a right to
marital freedom according to all visions of substantive equality identified.
The state has long enforced women’s subordinate status in society
through laws regulating the family.106 Correspondingly, while feminist
theories differ in many regards, “[a] continuous ideological thread of feminist
theory through time and across continents is the common understanding that
male power is linked to the subjugation and servitude of women in the
home.”107 As this Part will show, the law has played a key role in enforcing
and maintaining status inequalities between husband and wife, which persist
to the present day in varying degrees. It is fueled by and in turn fuels gender
discrimination in society at large, situating marriage at “the heart of
politics”108 for feminists of all stripes.109 Precisely because of the contribution
105

106
107

108
109

In addition to being a substantive equality right, marital freedom is also a formal equality right. See
Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
April 2020).
G. Kristian Miccio, Exiled from the Province of Care: Domestic Violence, Duty and Conceptions of State
Accountability, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 111, 152 (2005); Siegel, supra note 43, at 1036.
Kathleen Mahoney, Theoretical Perspectives on Women’s Human Rights and Strategies for Their
Implementation, 21 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 799, 800 (1996); see also Post & Siegel, supra note 7
(“[F]eminists often disagreed about the conditions of women’s subordination, but there were certain
matters about which they spoke with near unanimity. A core premise of the emergent feminist
movement was that women’s claim to equal rights with men entailed a challenge to the social
organization of the family.”).
Mahoney, supra note 107, at 801.
Indeed, all major social contract theorists understand the institution of marriage as central to female
subordination. See Katherine O’Donovan, Marriage: A Sacred Union or Profane Love Machine?, 1
FEMINIST LEGAL STUD. 75, 88 (1993); Mahoney, supra note 107, at 801 (noting that based on their
shared understanding of the home as a locus for women’s oppression, feminist theories define the
political very differently from theories developed from a male perspective, and that this idea is wellexpressed in the slogans, “the personal is political”); see also Frances E. Olsen, The Family and The
Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1505 (1983); OKIN, supra note 4,
at 125–26; Martha Albertson Fineman, Why Marriage?, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L. 239, 246 (2001)
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of marriage to gender hierarchy in family and society, a strict divorce
regime—even one that does not expressly differentiate between the sexes—
adversely impacts women; the effect, if not the intent, is substantive gender
inequality.
A. Marital Subordination in Historical Perspective
Marriage, as it was regulated from this nation’s formation through the
lesser part of the twentieth century, visited tremendous harms upon women.
Upon the founding of the United States, men declared their independence
from the English king, but clung to laws that made them “the kings of their
own castle.”110 A legal regime of official discrimination and exploitation, the
common law of marital status fostered relationships based on dependence
and domination rather than equality and interdependence. The restrictive
laws of divorce further constrained women’s place both at home and in
society; as feminists of the time saw it, divorce restrictions were among the
most powerful sources of women’s subordination and gender inequality.
Upon marriage, the law treated women as “civilly dead,” deeming their
legal existence “suspended,” “incorporated,” and “consolidated” into the
legal existence of their husbands.111 The compulsion to assume their
husbands’ names was an obvious marker of married women’s loss of their
separate identity.112 As documented amply by historians of marriage, the
coverture doctrine structured marriage to give husbands authority over their

110
111

112

(feminist family theorists have demonstrated that marriage is a public institution); CATHARINE
MACKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST THEORY OF THE STATE 191 (1989); Robert C. Post, Three
Concepts of Privacy, 89 GEO. L.J. 2087, 2098 (2001); KATE MILLETT, SEXUAL POLITICS 33, 36 (1969)
(arguing that marriage is “the keystone of the stratification system, the social mechanism by which
it is maintained.”).
EVAN GERSTMANN, SAME-SEX MARRIAGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 63 (2017).
Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary Servitude, and the Thirteenth Amendment,
4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 207, 208 n.9 (1991) (the metaphor of “women as slaves” referred to
the status and condition of women upon marriage). Accounts of marital advice women received
were even worse, speaking “even more forthrightly about the wife’s status as a subordinate member
of the relationship.” Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105
YALE L.J. 2117, 2145 (1996).
McConnell, supra note 111, at 249 (showing that women were legally compelled to adopt their
husbands’ surnames). Even throughout the twentieth century, several states interpreted their laws
to require that married women assume their husband’s surnames for various purposes. See, e.g.,
Forbush v. Wallace, 341 F. Supp. 217, 222–23 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff’d per curiam, 405 U.S. 970
(1972) (finding that Alabama’s law requiring a woman to assume her husband’s surname upon
marriage had a rational basis and furthered a legitimate state interest).
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wives in almost all aspects of the relationship.113 Wives owed their husbands
strict obedience in all matters,114 along with sexual and domestic services,
and they could not sue their husbands for mistreatment.115 The commonlaw doctrine of marital unity further worked to deprive wives of access to and
ownership of income and property brought into or accumulated during the
marriage—civil disabilities that greatly exacerbated women’s already
substantial economic and social dependence on their husbands. Anything
that once belonged to a wife became her husband’s property, and some
commentators go so far as to suggest that a wife herself was viewed as her
husband’s property.116
While the common law of marital status limited wives’ capacity for
citizenship, it expanded husbands’ citizenship stature, promoting the man’s
113

114

115

116

For an overview of common-law rules governing marital status in the antebellum period, see
NORMA BASCH, IN THE EYES OF THE LAW: WOMEN, MARRIAGE, AND PROPERTY IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY NEW YORK 47–55, 70–112 (1982); NANCY COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A
HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 9–23 (2000); LINDA K. KERBER, NO
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO BE LADIES 8–15 (1998). For an overview of other historical periods,
see, e.g., Linda McClain, “God’s Created Order,” Gender Complementarity, and the Federal Marriage
Amendment, 20 BYU J. PUB. L. 313, 339 (2006); Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital Expectations
in Nineteenth Century America, 80 GEO. L.J. 95, 129 (1991) (to be married in the nineteenth century
meant that “one assumed the character of a husband or a wife and that, in consequence, one was
joined in a permanent relationship of power and submission”); Siegel, supra note 41, at 1114 (“the
common law organized the ‘domestic’ relations of husband/wife and master/servant as relations
of governance and dependence, with the law specifying the rights and obligations of superior and
inferior parties”); Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights
and Family Law in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2018 (2000);
Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1462–65 (1992) (discussing the
legal implications of the marital unity doctrine in the past and even at present).
Nancy F. Cott, Divorce and the Changing Status of Women in Eighteenth-Century Massachusetts, 33 WM. &
MARY Q. 586, 611–12 (1976); Reva B. Siegel, Valuing Housework: Nineteenth-Century Anxieties About the
Commodification of Domestic Labor, 41 AM. BEHAV. SCIENTIST 1437, 1440 (1998) (noting that the wife’s
duty in common law was to submit to and serve her husband).
See generally DAVID GALENSON, WHITE SERVITUDE IN COLONIAL AMERICA: AN ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1981); STEPHEN INNES, WORK AND LABOR IN EARLY AMERICA (1988) (analyzing
labor relationships and arrangements across groups in early America).
See, e.g., HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF DIVORCE LAW IN
THE UNITED STATES 106 (1988) (finding that once married, a woman was deprived of control over
all property she had owned beforehand); Blanche Crozier, Marital Support, 15 B.U. L. REV. 28 (1935)
(noting that at the English common law, “the wife was, in economic relationship to the husband,
his property”); Isabel Marcus, Reflections on the Significance of the Sex/Gender System: Divorce Law Reform
in New York, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 55, 64–65 (1987) (describing how marriage served as a bar to
formal access to all forms of property for women); Reva B. Siegel, Home as Work: The First Woman’s
Rights Claims Concerning Wives’ Household Labor, 1850–1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073, 1082 (1994) (showing
that marriage gave the husband the use of the wife’s real property, personality, and services).
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role as head of household, economic provider, and political representative.117
At common law, a husband enjoyed the right to make all decisions for the
family unit and to supervise his wife’s actions, control her domestic labor,118
dominate her body and sexuality,119 determine whether she would bear
children, and physically chastise her if she defied his authority.120 This
regime of gender hierarchy continued to be legally enforced and judicially
exalted well into the twentieth century.121
Importantly, the structural inequalities built into the institution of
marriage were mandatory and uniform. The state defined marriage as
comprised of a husband-provider and wife-dependent, and individuals could
not contract out of these sex-role prescriptions.122 Over and over again,
courts refused to give legal effect to private agreements to alter the gendered
117

118

119

120

121

122

Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring) (“So firmly fixed was this
sentiment in the founders of the common law that it became a maxim of that system of
jurisprudence that a woman had no legal existence separate from her husband, who was regarded
as her head and representative in the social state . . . .”); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES *432–33 (describing how a husband was considered superior to his wife and could
control her as he would his servants or children).
Naomi Cahn, Faithless Wives and Lazy Husbands: Gender Norms in Nineteenth-Century Divorce Law, 2002
U. ILL. L. REV. 651, 686 (2002). See generally Elizabeth B. Clark, Matrimonial Bonds: Slavery and Divorce
in Nineteenth-Century America, 8 L. & HIST. REV. 25 (1990) (describing how the position of women in
nineteenth century marriages was comparable to that of an individual in bondage).
Jill Elaine Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of Marital Rape, 88 CALIF. L. REV 1373 (2000);
Marybeth Herald, A Bedroom of One’s Own: Morality and Sexual Privacy After Lawrence v. Texas, 16
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 13 (2004).
Husbands enjoyed the right to physically chastise wives, a right that knew no meaningful limits
because courts refused to intervene “to prevent the deplorable spectacle of the exhibition of similar
cases in our courts of justice.” Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 156, 158 (Miss. 1824); see also
Amy Eppler, Battered Women and the Equal Protection Clause: Will the Constitution Help Them When the
Police Won’t?, 95 YALE L.J. 788, 792 (1986) (finding that a husband had a right to physically chastise
his wife as a corollary to his right to rule the home at common law).
See, e.g., Chapman v. Mitchell, 44 A.2d, 392, 393 (1945) (asserting that male is the “master of his
household”, the “managing head, with control and power to preserve the family relation … and to
guide their conduct.”). As recently as the 1960s, the Supreme Court still insisted in a unanimous
opinion that notwithstanding the recent “enlightened emancipation of women,” they are “still
regarded as the center of home and family life.” Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1961).
American courts have always refused to uphold marriage contracts that varied or particularized the
traditional incidents of marriage, most notably the reciprocal marital duties of support and
provision of domestic services, as well as husband’s privileges to determine the residence and
domicile of the couple and to give his name to family members. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Higgason,
516 P.2d 289 (Cal. 1973) (failing to enforce a prenuptial agreement where husband and wife waived
rights to support); Watkins v. Watkins, 143 Cal. App. 3d. 651, 654–55 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983)
(examining the rule that a married woman could not contract with her husband regarding domestic
services incidental to marital status).
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terms of the traditional marriage contract.123 This contractual disability in
turn helped perpetuate gender hierarchy within marriage.124
The marriage contract was not only non-modifiable; it was also
unenforceable. Married women were unable to enforce even the sparse
protections that marriage afforded. Courts assiduously refused to intervene
so long as a couple remained married, no matter how grossly the husband
ignored his marital duties or abused his marital prerogatives.125 The result
in all too many cases was that married women were forced to endure a life
of submission and accept their imposed domesticity.126 It is little wonder that
ever since the emergence of feminism in the United States, injustice within
marriage has been a rallying cry. Antebellum feminists fiercely attacked the
marital institution for giving husbands “unlimited power” while subsuming
wives’ wills and denying them full citizenship.127 Many abolitionist and
feminist activists described marriage as bondage or enslavement, a pointed
reference to the legal trappings of the institution and the physical and
emotional relations between husband and wife.128 As they insisted,
egalitarian marriage must be an inalienable human right.129 Throughout,
the laws of divorce played a complementary role.

123

124
125

126
127
128
129

Courts feared that “giving legal sanction to marital bargaining would empower wives in ways that
threatened the customary distribution of wealth and work in marriage.” Siegel, supra note 114, at
1449.
Marjorie M. Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model for State Policy, 70 CALIF. L. REV.
207, 271 (1982).
Illustrative of the dependency of wives and the tyranny of their men under the traditional marriage
contract, unenforceable in court, is the paradigmatic Nebraska case, McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d
336, 342 (Neb. 1953) (refusing to consider a wife’s suit against her husband for inadequate support
because the living standards of a family are for the household, and not the courts, to decide). See
Shultz, supra note 124, at 234 (noting that the result in McGuire “is so common that commentators
treat the unenforceability of support obligations during marriage as a given of marital law”).
Naomi R. Cahn, The Moral Complexities of Family Law, 50 STAN. L. REV. 225, 246–47 (1997); see also
RUTHANN ROBSON, LESBIAN (OUT)LAW: SURVIVAL UNDER THE RULE OF LAW 124–27 (1992).
KERBER, supra note 113, at 12; MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 58.
COTT, supra note 113, at 57–68; MCCLAIN, supra note 127, at 58; Clark, supra note 118, at 30–31.
Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28 HARV. C.R-C.L. L. REV.
299, 324 (1993) (noting that influential women’s rights advocates in the nineteenth century deemed
the right of egalitarian, non-patriarchal marriage inalienable).
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1. The Complementary Functions of Divorce Restrictions in Enforcing Women’s
Subordinate Status
The patriarchal construction of marriage required a strict divorce
regime.130 Any right to renounce husbandly authority constituted a direct
threat to the coverture doctrine, defying the notion that a married couple
represents a single entity controlled by the husband.131 As one scholar put it,
“the old common law fiction that husband and wife were one and the
husband was the one could no longer hold quite the same authority once
divorce challenged the male-dominated corporatism of marriage.”132
Beyond the goal of shoring up common-law marriage, divorce rights were
strictly limited to preserve male honor. Marriage played a crucial role in
conferring—and confirming—masculinity, such that a man’s failure to
establish himself as a dominating husband undermined his image as a
sovereign capable of participating in the business of governance.133 For a
man, therefore, divorce was considered “a disaster, a source of overwhelming
shame.”134 Viewed thus, it is easy to understand why divorce law managed
to remain gender-neutral for much of American history. Women bore such
a disproportionate share of the burdens of strict exit rules, while men had
little need to escape marriage and much interest in maintaining it. Hence,
laws that were sex-blind in theory, privileged men and manifestly
disadvantaged women in practice.135

130

131
132
133

134
135

GWYNN DAVIS & MERVYN MURCH, GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE 69 (1988) (the freedom to leave
through divorce undermines male-dominated and male-oriented marriage); OKIN, supra note 4, at
129–30.
Herma Hill Kay, From the Second Sex to the Joint Venture: An Overview of Women’s Rights and Family Law
in the United States During the Twentieth Century, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2017, 2032 (2000).
NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE: FROM THE REVOLUTIONARY GENERATION
TO THE VICTORIANS 42 (1999).
STEVEN NOCK, MARRIAGE IN MEN’S LIVES 58–59 (1998) (explaining the important role of
marriage in conferring masculinity in all ages and the respect and social recognition that men
receive from being married); see also MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 135 (2006) (arguing that marriage is
a “central site in which men define and display their masculinity,” affording them social recognition
and respect).
HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 101 (2000).
For example, Thomas Jefferson, a staunch advocate of divorce, envisioned marital freedom as a
remedy for women: while a husband had “many ways of rendering his domestic affairs agreeable,
by Command or desertion,” a wife was “confined [and] subject”; the freedom of divorce would
restore “to women their natural right to equality.” Frank L. Dewey, Thomas Jefferson’s Notes on
Divorce, 39 WM. & MARY Q. 212, 219 (1982).
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Ultimately, divorce restrictions were the manifestation of a society unable
or unwilling to see women in any role other than that of wife and mother.136
In a world in which wifehood was the defining characteristic of womanhood,
not merely one of its incidents, a unilateral no-fault right to divorce was
simply inconceivable.137 Even as many jurisdictions began to enlarge the
gamut exit options from marriage, the fault grounds they enacted actively
reified sex-role expectations during marriage.138 This Article’s companion,
focusing on divorce as a formal gender-equality right, will analyze how fault
restrictions framed a deeply hierarchical vision of marital relations by rigidly
policing gender-stereotypical behavior.139
It is little wonder, then, that liberal divorce has long been associated with
women’s most basic rights.140 By the nineteenth century, feminists well
understood marriage as a gender-subordination mechanism and divorce as
an anti-subordination right that secures values of equal citizenship for
women.
2. Toward a Feminist Understanding of the Equal Protection Clause: Rights of
Exit in Early Feminist Theory
If we interpret the Equal Protection Clause based on the historical
understandings and experiences of its feminist predecessors and
contemporaries, as some constitutional scholars challenge us to do, then
ostensibly sex-neutral limitations on divorce are a potent violation of gender
136
137

138

139
140

Eppler, supra note 120, at 802; Kenneth L. Karst, Woman’s Constitution, 1984 DUKE L.J. 447, 458.
Nora J. Lauerman, A Step Toward Enhancing Equality, Choice, and Opportunity to Develop in Marriage and
at Divorce, 56 CINCINNATI L. REV. 493, 510 n. 66 (1987) (“Traditionally, the law was premised on
the stereotypic assumption that a married woman’s only acceptable place was in the home, that her
only truly legitimate role was that of homemaker/mother.”).
OKIN, supra note 4, at 130; LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE
UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMICAL CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 2 (1987); Cahn, supra note 14, at 660.
Karin Carmit Yefet, Divorce as a Formal Gender-Equality Right, 22 U. PA. J. CONST. L. (forthcoming
April 2020).
J. HERBIE DIFONZO, BENEATH THE FAULT LINE: THE POPULAR AND LEGAL CULTURE OF
DIVORCE IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 14 (1997) (arguing that divorce has been perceived
as a “woman’s issue” in the United States); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE
CULTURE: RETHINKING OUR COMMITMENTS TO MARRIAGE AND FAMILY 16 (1998) (also noting
the popular perception of divorce as a concern exclusive to women); Brown, supra note 3, at 248
(noting that a liberal right to divorce was a feminist issue since the early days of the country); Cahn,
supra note 126, at 230 (divorce was historically associated with women’s independence and
liberation).

February 2020]

DIVORCE AS A SUBSTANTIVE GENDER-EQUALITY RIGHT

485

equality.141 Indeed, nineteenth century feminists vociferously advocated
liberalized divorce rules,142 cautioning that strict limitations on exit resulted
in the “subjugation of wives to domination by their husbands.”143 Their
constant refrain analogizing marriage to slavery virtually compelled their
audiences to contemplate divorce as a form of emancipation.144
Elizabeth Cady Stanton was a particularly vocal—and influential—
champion of liberal divorce,145 exclaiming with characteristic eloquence that
“[t]here is no other human slavery that knows such depths of degradations
as a wife chained to a man whom she neither loves nor respects, no other
slavery so disastrous in its consequences on the race, or to individual respect,
growth and development.”146 According to Stanton and other liberal
feminists, one of the most important tenets of freedom and emancipation for
women were “self-ownership within marriage and a right to divorce if the
marriage became degrading.”147 Liberal divorce laws were for oppressed
wives, Stanton often stated, “what Canada was for Southern slaves.”148

141
142

143
144
145

146
147
148

Finley, supra note 63, at 449 (2004).
NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 87–88, 93–115 (1962); MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE
LAW 38–39 (1972) (“Reform of divorce laws became a tenet of the aggressive feminist movement
of the mid-nineteenth century”); GLENDA RILEY, DIVORCE: AN AMERICAN TRADITION 73–77,
115–16 (1991).
RHEINSTEIN, supra note 142, at 43.
Clark, supra note 118, at 34. For example, Elizabeth Stanton used the paradigms of slavery and
freedom to describe the condition of women within marriage. Id. at 26.
Stanton’s writings on divorce are scattered in many sources. See, e.g., ELIZABETH CADY STANTON,
HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 716–22, 738–42, 860–61 (1881); Elizabeth Cady Stanton,
Address Before the Judiciary Comm. of the N.Y. S. on the Divorce Bill (Feb. 8, 1861), available at
https://www.loc.gov/item/mss412100063/ [hereinafter Stanton, Address on the Divorce Bill]
(documenting Stanton’s speech before the New York Senate on the importance of divorce for
equality); Elizabeth Cady Stanton, On Marriage and Divorce, Address at the Decade Meeting (Oct.
20, 1870), in A HISTORY OF THE NATIONAL WOMAN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT, FOR TWENTY
YEARS 59 (Paulina W. Davis ed., Journeymen Printers’ Co-Operative Ass’n 1871) (transcribing
Stanton’s speech on marriage and divorce).
THE ELIZABETH CADY STANTON-SUSAN B. ANTHONY READER 133 (Ellen Carol DuBois ed., rev.
ed., 1992).
Clark, supra note 144, at 34; see also id. at 36–37 (documenting examples of Stanton’s making these
remarks in her speeches and writings).
See, e.g., Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Divorce Versus Domestic Warfare, in DIVORCE: THE FIRST DEBATES
560–61 (David J. Rothman & Sheila M. Rothman eds., 1987) (arguing that because the abolition
of slavery precluded the proposition that people are property, women should not be viewed as the
property of their husbands and thus liberal divorce laws should be the norm); Elizabeth Cady
Stanton, The Need of Liberal Divorce Laws, 139 N. AM. REV. 234, 243 (1884); Tracy A. Thomas,
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The women who gathered for the first U.S. women’s rights convention,
held in Seneca Falls in 1848, identified “marital bondage” and restrictions
on exit as major sources of gender subordination.149 The Declaration of
Sentiments they issued proclaimed that men have “so framed the laws of
divorce, as to what shall be the proper causes of divorce . . . as to be wholly
regardless of the happiness of women—the law, in all cases, going upon a
false supposition of the supremacy of man, and giving all power into his
hands.”150 Accordingly, feminist leaders demanded “complete freedom of
either party at any time to terminate the marriage relationship”151 as critical
to cultivating equality, dignity, and partnership for women within
marriage.152
The activist work, legislative reform efforts, and public speeches on
divorce that followed the Seneca Falls Convention advocated an end to
divorce laws that disparately impacted women and to state tolerance of
private oppression and violence in marriage.153 At the Tenth National
Women’s Rights Convention in 1860, for example, Stanton advocated nofault divorce to end “legalized prostitution of coerced marital intercourse and
unwilling maternity.”154 In her 1861 appeal to the New York legislature to
liberalize divorce law, Stanton argued that restricting divorce to specific
grounds especially burdens women and often confines them to a life of
degradation, bodily harm, and economic dependence.155 As she saw it,
divorce-restrictive regulations were a necessary step “in order to establish

149

150

151
152

153
154

155

Elizabeth Cady Stanton on the Federal Marriage Amendment: A Letter to the President, 22 CONST. COMMENT.
137, 139–40 (2005).
JOAN HOFF, LAW, GENDER, AND INJUSTICE: A LEGAL HISTORY OF U.S. WOMEN 139 (1991)
(citing THE REVOLUTION, Oct. 27, 1870, at 264). Women’s activists complained that the laws of
marriage and divorce were framed to benefit men and entrap women within the oppressive
institution of marriage. Clark, supra note 144, at 25.
Declaration of Sentiments and Resolutions (Seneca Falls Convention, 1848), reprinted in UP FROM
THE PEDESTAL: SELECTED WRITINGS IN THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FEMINISM 185 (Aileen S.
Kraditor ed., 1968); see also THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN FEMINISM: THE SENECA FALLS
CONVENTION OF 1848, at 87 (Virginia Bernhard & Elizabeth Fox-Genovese eds., 1995).
MAX RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILITY, DIVORCE, AND THE LAW 40 (1972).
NELSON MANFRED BLAKE, THE ROAD TO RENO: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN THE UNITED
STATES 87–92 (1962); KATHLEEN BARRY, SUSAN B. ANTHONY: A BIOGRAPHY OF A SINGULAR
FEMINIST 137 (1988); Clark, supra note 118, at 26–29.
Finley, supra note 63, at 443.
Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United
States Constitution 1820–1878, in A LESS THAN PERFECT UNION: ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 104, 111 (Jules Lobel ed., 1988).
See Stanton, Address on the Divorce Bill, supra note 145, at 9; Finley, supra note 63, at 444.
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man’s authority over woman.”156 Stanton and Susan B. Anthony devoted
numerous editorials in their weekly newspaper to advocating free availability
of marital freedom.157
In short, “‘She’ The People”—the women’s rights movement that
supported the vision of freedom and equality encapsulated in the Fourteenth
Amendment—understood liberal divorce as a substantive equality right,
critical for ameliorating the persisting subordination of women.
Concededly, not all feminists signed onto the divorce agenda,158 but the
“case made by radical feminists for a thorough-going overhaul of divorce and
family law framed an agenda that eventually became well accepted by
reformers in the post-Civil War era.”159 Indeed, the Stantonian agenda for
greater gender equality in marriage and for a no-fault right of exit as
prerequisites for substantive gender equality became “the dominant way”160
of viewing marriage and divorce and contributed to the egalitarian legal
changes that followed.
B. Legal Equality Versus Marital Reality: Gender Hierarchy in Contemporary
Marriages
This Section focuses on the institution of contemporary marriages,
contrasting legal equality with marital reality. As the analysis will document,
despite legal developments in women’s position in family and society, the
156
157
158

159
160

Finley, supra note 63, at 444 (quoting Elizabeth Cady Stanton, Home Life, in THE ELIZABETH CADY
STANTON-SUSAN B. ANTHONY READER, supra note 146, at 131–38).
BLAKE, supra note 142, at 99; WILLIAM L. O’NEIL, DIVORCE IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA 206
(1967).
Women’s advocates were not as unified on questions of marriage as they were on, say, the issue of
suffrage. As Katharine Bartlett correctly notes, pro-marriage feminists disfavored divorce “in part
because it would result in their being cast off beyond their primes when their prospects for
remarriage were bleak.” Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminism and Family Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 475, 477
(1999); see also Kay, supra note 14, at 2027 (discussing the different views leaders of the nineteenth
century women’s movement had on divorce); see also Clark, supra note 118, at 25–26, 47 (explaining
that divorce was a complex and divisive issue for feminists throughout the nineteenth century, and
that many feminists spoke of divorce reluctantly out of fear of being branded as anti-marriage or
anti-family or out of concern that Stanton’s vision of liberal divorce would taint the quest for
suffrage). For the concerns of both pro-divorce and pro-marriage nineteenth-century feminists, see
BASCH, supra note 132, at 68–80; MIRIAM GURKO, THE LADIES OF SENECA FALLS: THE BIRTH
OF THE WOMEN’S RIGHTS MOVEMENT 202–06 (1974).
Bartlett, supra note 158, at 477–78.
Id. at 484; see Clark, supra note 118, at 26, 43 (noting how many ideas central to Stanton’s work
have become dominant in modern society).
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shadow of the patriarchal family still hovers over modern marriages,
profoundly shaping husband-wife relationships and women’s overall status.
Against this backdrop, liberal divorce is revealed as a substantive equality
right of constitutional significance, given the close ties between emancipation
from marital subordination and the guarantees of equal citizenship.
1. Egalitarian Legal Rhetoric: The Modern Transformation of Marital Status Law
The early women’s rights movement, which protested against the
hierarchical strictures of marriage, was in large part responsible for the
incremental reform of marital status law beginning in the second half of the
nineteenth century.161 As Reva Siegel has shown in her work on nineteenth
century marriage law, women’s demands for autonomy and equality in
marriage slowly began to find resonance with state legislatures, which in turn
modified many aspects of common-law coverture.162 Thus, marriage law
slowly resurrected women from their civil deaths,163 and divorce law became
more liberalized, at least in part thanks to feminist demands.164
Well into the second half of the twentieth century, however, the legal
system still continued to allocate privileges and entitlements with respect to
marriage and divorce in a manner that perpetuated overt gender

161

162

163

164

Siegel, supra note 41, at 1116–17 (noting that by the 1850s, the woman’s rights movement was
meeting in national and regional conventions and circulating legislative petitions to protest the
common law of marriage).
See Reva B. Siegel, The Modernization of Marital Status Law: Adjudicating Wives’ Rights to Earnings, 1860–
1930, 82 GEO. L.J. 2127, 2149–68 (1994) (describing reform in nineteenth-century New York);
Siegel, supra note 41, at 1117 (noting that towards the end of the century women were able to engage
in third party transactions); Siegel, supra note 111, at 2119 (describing efforts the American feminist
movement of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries took to secure wives’ equality with their
husbands). For reform in other jurisdictions see Richard H. Chused, Late Nineteenth Century Married
Women’s Property Law: Reception of the Early Married Women’s Property Acts by Courts and Legislatures, 29
AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 3, 3–5 (1985); Joseph Warren, Husband’s Rights to Wife’s Services (pts. 1–2), 38
HARV. L. REV. 421, 622 (1925).
For a volume of essays describing various nineteenth-century reforms of marital property and
contract law, see Domestic Relations and Law, in 3 HISTORY OF WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES:
HISTORICAL ARTICLES ON WOMEN’S LIVES AND ACTIVITIES (Nancy F. Cott ed., 1992).
Rigby, supra note 13, at 562 (noting that in the mid-1800s divorce laws were liberalized due to
attempts to establish equal rights for women); DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX
DISCRIMINATION AND THE LAW 28 (1991) (as the century progressed, both legislative and judicial
attitudes toward divorce became more liberal, partly in response to feminist demands); see also
Bartlett, supra note 158, at 478.
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hierarchy.165 Only since the Supreme Court imported gender-equality
concerns into its equal protection jurisprudence have the statute books
largely purged explicit references to sex roles and stereotypes.166 Gender
equality became the new organizing principle of family law, as the legal
system reconceived spouses and their family responsibilities in sex-neural
terminology167 and granted them a liberal right of marital exit free of fault or
spousal consent considerations.168
While the attainment of gender equality initially was not a stated goal of
the no-fault reform efforts in California—the first state to legalize no-fault
divorce169—feminists in several other states became deeply involved in
pushing for a more liberal divorce regime.170 The elimination of fault
165

166

167

168
169

170

For example, even after the Married Women’s Property Acts eliminated aspects of a husband’s
legal control over his wife’s property, they did not eliminate the other elements of the marital
contract, such as the wife’s duty to obey and provide domestic service. Wives also still lacked
property rights in their household labor, which remained their husbands’ by marital right; in all
states, the common law still disabled a wife from making an enforceable contract with her husband
for compensation for the labor she performed for their family. “Partial capacity” thus continued
to be the defining reality of wives’ lives in nineteenth-century family law. See MCCLAIN, supra note
2, at 59–60 (exploring shifts in the perception of marriage from the time of the Married Women’s
Property Acts to the 1970s); Siegel, supra note 116, at 1112–88 (describing the women’s rights
movement’s efforts to justify demands for joint property rights in marriage).
See, e.g., Kirchberg v. Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981) (invalidating Louisiana community
property law treating husbands as “head and master” of property jointly owned with wife); Orr v.
Orr, 440 U.S. 268, 270–71 (1979) (invalidating a law requiring only men to pay alimony to their
ex-wives); see also Maxine Eichner, Marriage and the Elephant: The Liberal Democratic State’s Regulation of
Intimate Relationships Between Adults, HARV. J.L. & GENDER 25, 47 (2007) (recognizing that since the
1970s marriage has lost its gender-based duties); Susan Frelich Appleton, Missing in Action? Searching
for Gender Talk in the Same-Sex Marriage Debate, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 97, 113 (2005) (the legal
system eliminated different rules for women and men in areas of alimony, child custody, property
management, and estate oversight).
Martha Albertson Fineman, Progress and Progression in Family Law, U. CHI. LEGAL F. 1, 7 (2004) (“The
legal relationship between husband and wife has been completely rewritten in gender–neutral,
equality aspiring terms”); MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 61, 76.
JACOB, supra note 116, at 5; Singer, supra note 113, at 1462–65.
Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 293 (1987);
Herma Hill Kay, Equality and Difference: A Perspective on No-Fault Divorce and Its Aftermath, 56 U.
CINCINNATI L. REV. 1, 43–44 (1987); RHODE, supra note 164; JACOB, supra note 116, at 168
(“[T]he feminists who might otherwise have been attracted to divorce law reform were preoccupied
with the Equal Rights Amendment, abortion, and other issues . . . .”).
Martha L. Fineman, Implementing Equality: Ideology, Contradiction and Social Change: A Study of Rhetoric
and Results in the Regulation of the Consequences of Divorce, WIS. L. REV. 789, 811 (1983) (noting that the
major actor in divorce reform in Wisconsin was the feminist community); Jana B. Singer, Divorce
Reform and Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. Rev. 1103, 1105 (1989) (highlighting that the no-fault revolution
was supported by a number of women’s rights advocates).
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became a symbol of scrapping sex-based presumptions,171 and a liberal right
to divorce was perceived by many women as “a splendid enhancement of
their status both in marriage and after,”172 a social validation of the female
right to self-actualization.173
The gradual repudiation of coverture and the legal disabilities attending
marriage have, of course, substantially reduced the significance of marriage
as a limitation on women’s ability to participate as equal citizens in society.
Yet, as the ensuing analysis will demonstrate, the dramatic legal
transformation of marital status rules has not effected a commensurate
transformation in the lived experience of marriage. While gender hierarchy
is surely not as severe or overt as it was during the nineteenth-century marital
regime, significant status inequalities still persist between twenty-first century
husbands and wives.
2. Marital Reality Today: Documenting Private Patriarchy and its Public
Consequences
Well into the twenty-first century, egalitarian marriage—however
modestly defined174—still remains a “downright contradiction of terms.”175
The majority of contemporary couples, regardless of race or class, live
according to either the traditional marriage model, characterized by gender
specialization that confines women’s talents to housekeeping and caretaking,
or the modern dual-earner model, where marital life is often directed by what
this Article calls “separate-spheres ideology in disguise.”176 Whatever the
model of marriage, social scientists have consistently detected that “his”

171

172

173

174
175
176

Thomas M. Mulroy, Are Women Losing the Battle?—No-Fault Divorce, 75 A.B.A. J. 76, 76 (1989); see also
Kay, supra note 14, at 2060 (recounting that California was the first state to consider no-fault
divorce).
J. Herbie DiFonzo, No-Fault Marital Dissolution: The Bitter Triumph of Naked Divorce, 31 S.D. L. REV.
519, 550 (1994); see also JACOB, supra note 116, at 3, 23 (detailing the effects that the feminist
movement had on views of marriage).
Martha L. Fineman, Neither Silent, Nor Revolutionary, 23 L. & SOC’Y REV. 945, 947 (1989); DIFONZO,
supra note 140, at 173; Nichols, supra note 20, at 939 (describing how women’s advocates celebrated
no-fault divorce for freeing women to realize their full potential by extricating themselves from
constraining marriages).
Wax, supra note 2, at 531–35.
APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 270.
To be sure, this is not to suggest that spouses are expected to or even should be equal in all respects.
In practice, however, marital inequality often translates into wifely subordination. See Frantz &
Dagan, supra note 10, at 91 & n.61 (distinguishing marriage from other joint enterprises).
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marriage—the husband’s—is overwhelmingly better than “hers”—the
wife’s.177
In what follows, this Subsection endeavors to show that the typical
marriage is a relationship not between equal partners but between
dominating and subordinate figures, according to three indices of marital
power: role specialization, decision-making authority, and the use of force.
It then examines women’s divorce accounts to demonstrate that women
recognize the subordinating effects of marriage on their lives and the
importance of divorce to achieving emancipation, independence, and
dignity.
a. Gender-Role Differentiation at Home and in the Market
Approximately one in five American marriages today involves a
breadwinner and a full-time homemaker.178 A wealth of literature has
eminently established that dividing economic and domestic responsibilities
on the basis of gender inevitably marginalizes women, limits their access to
universally valued resources, and devalues their contributions to their
families. 179
The role of breadwinner brings status, recognition, and economic reward
in the larger world; the role of the homemaker brings none.180 Breadwinning

177

178

179

180

See JESSIE BERNARD, THE FUTURE OF MARRIAGE 14 (2d ed. 1982) (“There are two marriages…
in every marital union, his and hers. And his . . . is better than hers.”); see also EILEEN MAVIS
HETHERINGTON & JOHN KELLY, FOR BETTER OR FOR WORSE: DIVORCE RECONSIDERED, at
ch. 2 (2003); CATHERINE KOHLER RIESSMAN, DIVORCE TALK: WOMEN AND MEN MAKE SENSE
OF PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 15 (1990).
JANICE M. STEIL, MARITAL EQUALITY: ITS RELATIONSHIP TO THE WELL-BEING OF HUSBANDS
AND WIVES 97 (1997); MARY FRANCES BERRY, THE POLITICS OF PARENTHOOD: CHILD CARE,
WOMEN’S RIGHTS, AND THE MYTH OF THE GOOD MOTHER 8 (1993) (observing that one woman
in five is a full-time homemaker); Catherine Albiston, Institutional Inequality, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 1093,
1124–25 (2009) (noting that 20% of families in 2006 fit the traditional model of a breadwinner and
a stay-at-home parent); Gretchen Livingston, Stay-at-Home Moms and Dads Account for About One-inFive U.S. Parents, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/09/24/stay-at-home-moms-and-dads-account-for-about-one-in-five-u-s-parents/.
STEIL, supra note 178, at 45–54; see also Vivian Hamilton, Mistaking Marriage for Social Policy, 11 VA.
J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 307, 317 (2004) (arguing that the marital family has contributed to the
marginalization of women).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 56; Martha L. A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of
Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2188 (1995) (“[T]he uncompensated tasks of caretaking are
placed with women while men pursue careers that provide economically for the family but also
enhance their individual career or work prospects.”).
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husbands acquire knowledge, income, status, and prestige from their work,
which enhances their independence, self-esteem, and social contacts.181
Husbands’ access to such resources significantly increases their bargaining
power within the marriage.182 Homemaking wives, by contrast, lack
financial independence and alternative sources of achievement, self-esteem,
and affirmation; enjoy limited opportunities to access resources and develop
competence; and highly depend on their marriages, factors that reduce their
influence and marital bargaining power.183
Entrenched societal values that place a high premium on paid
employment while devaluing unpaid housework further bolster
breadwinning husbands and marginalize the contributions of homemaking
wives.184 These adverse effects in turn converge in ways that make it
“exceedingly difficult for [a wife] to interact with her spouse as an equal
partner.”185 Indeed, social scientists of diverse orientations have found that,
while marriage benefits men on each and every measure of well-being
examined, for women it has often proven a source of personal unhappiness,
psychological costs, and restricted opportunities for personal achievement
and public participation.186 As Betty Friedan cautioned in The Feminine
181

182

183

184
185
186

Gregory S. Alexander, The New Marriage Contract and the Limits of Private Ordering, 73 IND. L.J. 503,
507 (1998) (“[M]en and women share unequally the benefits and burdens of marriage” and “[m]en
tend to have greater bargaining power and use that power advantage to satisfy their preferences at
the expense of their wives”).
OKIN, supra note 4, at 157–59 (describing studies of power within families demonstrating that “the
amount of money a person earns—in comparison with a partner’s income—establishes relative
power); M. Rivka Polatnick, Why Men Don’t Rear Children: A Power Analysis, in MOTHERING: ESSAYS
IN FEMINIST THEORY 21, 24–28 (Joyce Trebilcot ed., 1983); STEIL, supra note 178, at 47.
STEIL, supra note 178, at 47, 54. For the many benefits of participation in the labor force, see
Marion Crain, Feminizing Unions: Challenging the Gendered Structure of Wage Labor, 89 MICH. L. REV.
1155, 1177 (1991).
STEIL, supra note 178, at 47.
Id. (noting the validity of this conclusion even for couples who strive to minimize materialistic
concerns).
Systematic analyses of marriage and the family found that men tended to be more satisfied in their
relationships than women and that women, as a group, tended to be more seriously disappointed
in their marriages. Researchers depict contemporary marriage as a “bad bargain” for a woman,
affecting her life substantially more than a man’s and often causing women to experience a loss of
control over their own lives. See Robert L. Burgess, Relationships in Marriage and the Family, in 1
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS: STUDYING PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS 179, 185 (Steve Duck &
Robin Gilour eds., 1981); Anita Bernstein, For and Against Marriage: A Revision, 102 MICH. L. REV.
129, 178–79 (2003) (discussing the substantial gender gap in gains from marriage); STEIL, supra note
178, at 71, 103 (detailing the costs of marital inequality to women); id. at 87 (showing research
consistently reports that wives are less satisfied in marriage than husbands and that their marriages
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Mystique—a book credited with reawakening the women’s movement and
sparking Second-Wave Feminism in the United States187—women’s
specialization in the work of the home perpetuates men’s dominance and
women’s social and economic dependence.188
A growing majority of marriages today concededly function in a dualearner model,189 but considerable sociological research suggests that the
traditional gender roles of husband and wife “continue to provide a general
blueprint for marriage, situating men’s work primarily in the public sphere
and women’s in the private.”190 Even the most egalitarian, professional dualcareer couples tend to “build life structures with one foot in the past,
mimicking traditional marriages of their parents’ generation, and one foot in
the feminist influenced present . . . .”191 Many twenty-first century marriages
therefore continue to function as a limiting force on women’s ability to
participate as equal citizens.192 Some feminists have gone so far as to suggest
that married women in dual-earner marriages who work as providers in

187
188
189
190

191
192

are less affirming, less validating, and less nurturing than their husbands’); HETHERINGTON &
KELLY, supra note 177, at 23 (reporting the existence of “his” and “her” marriage and that his is
superior to hers); FALUDI, infra note 196, at 16–17 (noting that “if there’s one pattern that
psychological studies have established, it’s that the institution of marriage has an overwhelmingly
salutary effect on men’s mental health” and describing the extent to which marriage may be
hazardous to women’s health and that the two prime causes for female depression were low social
status and marriage); id. at 37; APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 3, 242 (reviewing studies and
concluding that married women are “the most depressed segment of the population”); Herma Hill
Kay, “Making Marriage and Divorce safe for Women” Revisited, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 75 (2004)
(marriage is “a limitation on the woman who seeks to realize her own individuality rather than
achieving identity through her husband.”).
MAREN LOCKWOOD CARDEN, THE NEW FEMINIST MOVEMENT 154–55 (1974); Kay, supra note
14, at 2049.
BETTY FRIEDAN, THE FEMININE MYSTIQUE 336–37 (Dell Publ’g 1983) (1963).
See, e.g., Crain, supra note 183, at 1177 (noting that almost two thirds of families have two wage
earners).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 51; see also MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 75 (noting the problem that
people accept the idea that sex equality is an appropriate public value yet may still believe that it
does not extend to the “private” sphere of marriage); Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New
Theory of Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2227, 2245 (1994) (explaining that women’s disproportionate
responsibility for household work influences the wage gap).
LISA R. SILBERSTEIN, DUAL-CAREER MARRIAGE: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 174 (1992).
See MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 135 (observing that the institution of marriage continues to shape
female identity and gender performance); J. Herbie DiFonzo & Ruth C. Stern, The Winding Road
from Form to Function: A Brief History of Contemporary Marriage, 21 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL LAW.
1, 28–29 (2008) (discussing how gendered norms still remain “pervasive” in the twenty-first
century); Fiss, supra note 50, at 418–19 (“[T]he dominant contemporary social understanding
continues to assign to women the primary responsibility for the care of children . . . .”).
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addition to homemakers exercise even greater levels of self-sacrifice than
women in traditional marriages, obtain fewer marital benefits, and may even
suffer from more inequality in marital bargaining.193
To begin with, husbands’ involvement in domestic, relationship, and
caretaking work is widely recognized as a barometer of wives’ bargaining
power.194 As studies extensively document, women’s chronic negotiating
weakness pushes even “modern” marriages to slip into gendered patterns,
characterized by grossly unequal divisions of labor in the family.195 While
married women have drastically increased their involvement in the paid
labor force, they continue to bear a highly disproportionate responsibility for
the work of the home, the children, and family relationships. As one writer
quipped somewhat hyperbolically, “the only major change” is that husbands
“think they do more around the house.”196
A wealth of literature about the marital division of labor has reported on
the overwhelming domestic duties imposed on married women, amounting
to a “double day” or “second shift” at home.197 Working wives perform
approximately eighty percent of the housework, spending about fifteen hours
more each week on housework than their husbands.198 Working women also

193
194

195

196
197

198

AUGUSTUS Y. NAPIER, THE FRAGILE BOND: IN SEARCH OF AN EQUAL, INTIMATE, AND
ENDURING MARRIAGE 78 (1988); Wax, supra note 2, at 515.
STEIL, supra note 178, at 26, 66 (explaining that the sharing of domestic tasks is the most frequently
cited barometer of relationship equality); Wax, supra note 2, at 603 (“[T]he wife’s decisions about
whether or how much to work are very much a function of her bargaining power within the marital
relationship.”).
FRANK F. FURSTENBERG, JR. & ANDREW J. CHERLIN, DIVIDED FAMILIES: WHAT HAPPENS TO
CHILDREN WHEN PARENTS PART 29 (1991) (stating that traditional provider/caregiver roles
continue to be a major organizing feature of household labor within contemporary marriages);
MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 106 (reinforcing that contemporary marriages use traditional
provider/caregiver roles); Fineman, supra note 5, at 270 (noting that a very high proportion of
marriages are still built upon a gender-based division of labor).
SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN xiv (1991).
ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT
HOME 33–58 (1989); Alicia Brokars Kelly, Money Matters in Marriage: Unmasking Interdependence in
Ongoing Spousal Economic Relations, 47 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 113, 125–26 (2008) (summarizing
research that “consistently” reaffirms the deeply gendered division of labor in marriage); see also
JANET STOCKS ET AL., MODERN COUPLES SHARING MONEY, SHARING LIFE 76 (2007) (compiling
research studies from the 2000s).
HOCHSCHILD, supra note 197, at 216–22, 259–62; Williams, supra note 190, at 2245. Writing in
the late 1990s, Janice Steil examined studies assessing the allocation of domestic work by both time
and task measurement strategies, and concluded that employed women continue to do at least two
thirds of the domestic work and that only between 2% and 12% of husbands in dual-earner families
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perform some two-thirds of the child care, and the little that men do tend to
be the pleasant kind of care.199 Women also disproportionately perform the
“emotion work” crucial to maintaining family relationships, work that
requires considerable time, effort, and skill yet generally goes
unacknowledged.200
To be sure, there is no evidence to support the common rejoinder that
wives’ disproportionate time spent on domestic labor is offset by husbands’
disproportionate time spent on waged labor. Sociologists report that women
typically perform much more family work even when employed the same
number of hours as their partners; husbands do not increase their domestic
responsibilities when their job demands decrease; and even when
unemployed they “do much less housework than a wife who puts in a fortyhour week.”201 Notably, husbands whose wives outearn them are the least
likely to share domestic responsibilities; their higher-earning wives may do
even more housework to compensate husbands for challenging their
masculinity and to protect their status as “primary” breadwinners.202

199

200
201

202

share domestic responsibilities equally. See STEIL, supra note 178, at 21, 55; see also HETHERINGTON
& KELLY, supra note 177, at 249; Karst, supra note 88, at 525–26.
For example, some studies found the typical American husband spends an average of twelve to
twenty-four minutes in solo child care each day. See Hamilton, supra note 179, at 318 (noting that
“shared” caretaking between parents “has remained illusory”). Husbands still feel entitled to avoid
domestic responsibilities; what little they do, they do not out of a sense of duty, but as “volunteers”
who “help” their working wives in managing the household. See RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 51.
Accordingly, many men feel proud, not guilty, with respect to the small amount of childcare they
do. See Williams, supra note 190, at 2238 (“I’m spending a whole lot more time on family than my
father did, and you’re spending far less time than your mother did. Consequently, you feel
incredibly guilty, while I naturally feel pretty proud of myself.”). Indeed, numerous studies have
repeatedly found that husbands still believe and act out as if their contributions are more valuable
than their wives, “just because they come from men.” Wax, supra note 2, at 582–83; id. at 589
(noting “[m]en’s tendency to attach little importance to women’s efforts”); see also HETHERINGTON
& KELLY, supra note 177, at 249 (comparing minimal rise in man’s contribution to household chores
to over doubling of mothers who work in a similar period).
See STEIL, supra note 178, at 85–87.
Id. at 52; OKIN, supra note 4, at 141, 153; Jennifer R. Johnson, Preferred by Law: The Disappearance of
the Traditional Family and Law’s Refusal to Let It Go, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 125, 129 (2004)
(“[S]tudies indicate that no matter how much money women make or how much value they place
on their careers, they retain the majority of the caretaking responsibility.”). For a comprehensive
review of the literature on this point see Wax, supra note 2, at 519–24.
Monica Biernat & Camille B. Wortman, Sharing of Home Responsibilities Between Professionally Employed
Women and Their Husbands, 60 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 844 (1991) (husbands of academic
women who earned less than their wives were found to do less child care than husbands who earned
more than their wives); HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 177, at 250 (finding that husbands
who earn less than wives tend to become even more reluctant to help in the work of the home);
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Even among couples that aspire to egalitarian relationships, husbands are
often at leisure while their wives are at work, either within or outside the
home, a phenomenon sociologists term “the work-leisure gap.”203 Employed
women work substantially longer hours than both housewives and
husbands,204 as men “have taken full advantage of their bargaining power to
minimize the extent to which women’s market efforts impinge on their
freedom and leisure.”205 By these measures, “modern” working wives are
paradoxically worse off than their “traditional” sisters.
It is worth noting that such gender inequality tends to grow stronger and
bolder as a marriage progresses.206 As Amy Wax has persuasively showed,
using bargaining theory principles, the longer women are married, the more
they experience a progressive erosion in their bargaining power, enabling
husbands to steadily pressure women to take on even more responsibility for
unpaid work.207
This modern form of separate spheres in disguise for husbands and wives
produces marital inequality and erodes women’s status in the family. Even
to this day, a majority of Americans still endorse the male-as-breadwinnerand-female-as-caregiver model and ascribe different meanings to the waged

203
204

205

206

207

Hochschild, supra note 197, at 216–22, 259–62 (husbands earning less than their wives were the
least likely to participate in housework); STEIL, supra note 178, at 53–54, 110.
STEIL, supra note 178, at 52–53; Wax, supra note 2, at 523.
NAPIER, supra note 193, at 78 (arguing women in dual-earner marriages are worse off than their
“traditional” counterparts, as they have to contend with even higher levels of self-denial and with
less time for their personal needs); Wax, supra note 2, at 591–92; Tammy R. Pettinato, Transforming
Marriage: The Transformation of Intimacy and the Democratizing Potential of Love, 9 J.L. FAM. STUD. 101,
112 (2007) (“When paid and unpaid labor are combined, women work much longer hours for much
less pay than men.”).
Wax, supra note 2, at 633; see also OKIN, supra note 4, at 153 (“husbands of wives with full-time jobs
averaged about two minutes more housework per day than did husbands in housewife-maintaining
families, hardly enough additional time to prepare a soft-boiled egg.”).
OKIN, supra note 4, at 123 (noting that the gendered division of labor in modern marriages
exacerbates the asymmetric power relation between husband and wife over time); id. at 156
(explaining that women as workers are disadvantaged by marriage itself, and more so the longer
the duration of the marriage); Joan M. Krauskopf & Sharon Burgess Seiling, A Pilot Study on Marital
Power as an Influence in Division of Pension Benefits at Divorce of Long Term Marriages, 2 J. DISP. RESOL.
169, 178 (1996) (noting that the differing marital roles increase a husband’s power and reduce a
wife’s power over time).
Wax, supra note 2, at 626–35 (discussing the phenomenon of the “bargaining squeeze” and
explaining the host of forces that push the division of labor in directions that favor men and that
decrease bargaining power to effect more spousal sharing of unpaid domestic work).
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labor of husbands and wives.208 As Pepper Schwartz concluded, “[t]he
linchpin of marital inequality is . . . the provider complex, a combination of
roles that give the man the responsibility for financially supporting the
family’s life-style and the woman all the auxiliary duties that allow the man
to devote himself to work.”209
This provider complex produces different expectations for husbands and
wives as to the rewards available from marriage. On the one hand, husbands
feel entitled to appreciation for acting as “primary” providers, feel justified
in putting their careers above their wives’, expect their wives’ undivided
support and household services, and perceive the time they dedicate to their
careers as an act of “family caring.”210 In this way, “even though, as a legal
matter, marriage no longer entails a status relationship in which husbands
have a duty to provide and may expect from wives services and obedience,
the ‘provider complex’ continues to carry with it such expectations.”211 On
the other hand, paid employment is still not considered an integral
component of women’s normative roles as wives, and so women workers are
frequently considered secondary wage earners in their families.212
Sociologists call this phenomenon an “ideological discount rate,” whereby a
woman’s earnings, no matter how high its proportion to family income, is
regarded as secondary.213 Indeed, this phenomenon is rampant among
208

209
210

211
212

213

Kelly, supra note 197, at 130–31, 135 (explaining that the male-as-breadwinner-and-female-ascaretaker model is still influential today and breadwinning is still part of the construct of
masculinity); Nancy E. Shurtz, Gender Equity and Tax Policy: The Theory of “Taxing Men”, 6 S. CAL.
REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 485, 531 (1997) (noting that surveys show a widespread belief in the
male “breadwinner” role); MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 137–38 (pointing to contemporary research
about gender roles within marriage).
PEPPER SCHWARTZ, PEER MARRIAGE: HOW LOVE BETWEEN EQUALS REALLY WORKS 111–13
(1994).
MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 72, 137 (summarizing that the association of men with the breadwinning
role often fosters inequality by yielding husbands more power and respect in marriage); OKIN, supra
note 4, at 14, 95.
MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 137.
See generally Allen M. Parkman, Bargaining Over Housework: The Frustrating Situation of Secondary Wage
Earners, 63 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 765 (2004) (observing that women tend to work less in the home
as their earnings increase outside the home); see also Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Contemporary Approaches
to Compensating Female Tort Victims for Incapacity to Work, 38 ALBERTA L. REV. 504, 509 (2000)
(recognizing that the lost earnings method of evaluating plaintiffs’ losses creates a gendered
problem); Philomila Tsoukala, Gary Becker, Legal Feminism, and the Costs of Moralizing Care, 16 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 357, 382 (2007) (citing sociological studies finding that most women are still
considered secondary wage earners and also take on the bulk of the child-rearing duties).
Kelly, supra note 197, at 130–31.

498

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:2

working class families where wives often provide at least half of total
income,214 and even in families where wives earn more than husbands.215
Viewed neither as primary providers, nor even as co-providers, working
wives are consistently excluded from the benefits associated with this
status.216
This leads to the devaluation of women’s work both at home and in the
labor market.217 Moreover, women’s “second-shift” or “double day” at
home has serious public repercussions for gender equality and women’s place
in society. Numerous married women have little choice but to work in lowerstatus, low-waged, or part-time jobs, forgo advancement opportunities, and
generally place a lower priority on their own careers for the sake of their
husbands.218 In fact, one third of married women with children are out of
the labor force; among married women who are employed, a third work only

214

215
216

217

218

See, e.g., Martin H. Malin, Unemployment Compensation in a Time of Increasing Work-Family Conflicts, 29
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 131, 133–34 (1996) (stating that fifty-five percent of employed women and
forty-eight percent of married employed women provide at least half of their families’ income); see
also FAMILIES AND WORK INST., WOMEN: THE NEW PROVIDERS 33 (1995) (evidencing the same
trend).
STEIL, supra note 178, at 66 (finding that of all the wives who out-earn husbands, the careers of
none were considered primary).
See Adjin-Tettey, supra note 212, at 509 (stating that the perception of women’s income as secondary
leads to devaluation of women’s work inside and outside of the home); see also Marion Crain & Ken
Matheny, “Labor’s Divided Ranks”: Privilege and the United Front Ideology, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1542,
1587–88 (1999) (discussing the problems women encounter because they are perceived as
“secondary” wage earners).
See STEIL, supra note 178, at 49 (“For women, separate gender roles preclude the view of a wife as
either primary provider or co-provider.”); Elizabeth Adjin-Tettey, Replicating and Perpetuating
Inequalities in Personal Injury Claims Through Female-Specific Contingencies, 49 MCGILL L.J. 309, 328 (2004)
(arguing that rigid gender roles lead to the assertion that there is “no need for women to engage in
paid employment”). Rather, most two-earner couples today find both incomes necessary to sustain
their standard of living. See, e.g., Crain, supra note 183, at 1176 (“The idea that most women are
secondary wage earners whose earnings are ‘pin money’ in the family economic situation is patently
false.”).
See JUDY GOLDBERG DEY & CATHERINE HILL, BEHIND THE PAY GAP 2 (2007) (“Mothers are more
likely than fathers (or other women) to work part time, take leave, or take a break from the work
force”); MILTON C. REGAN, FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 155 (1993) (stating
that “women are more likely than men to make career sacrifices in order to meet family
responsibilities, and therefore often are economically dependent on men”); Naomi Cahn, The Power
of Caretaking, 12 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 177, 185–86 (2000) (stating that women are much more
likely than men are to interrupt their work to care for children); Singer, supra note 170, at 1115
(same); Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: Independence, Autonomy, and Self
Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER, SOC. POL’Y & L. 13, 19–20 (2000) (highlighting the economic and
career costs of acting as a caretaker).
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part-time and many who work full-time are on the “mommy track.”219
Having been forced to make marriage-specific investments at the expense of
labor market investments,220 married women often become “wedlocked
wives,”221 limited in their professional capacities and deprived of
opportunities to participate in politics, influence social choices, and become
financially self-supporting.222 The result is wives pushed deep into the private
sphere and marginalized in the public sphere, a serious male-female wage
differential, and the strengthening of sex segregation in the economy.223

219
220

221
222

223

Williams, supra note 190, at 2237.
On this point, it is worth noting several important differences in the gender cultures of higher versus
lower socioeconomic status couples, though both result in the perpetuation of traditional gender
roles and the economic marginalization of women. In higher status families, driven by society’s
preference for male career success and an occupational culture where the “ideal worker” is assumed
to have no significant familial responsibilities, women who are themselves trained for professional
careers often have to marginalize their own labor market participation by performing domestic
services to promote their husbands’ occupational success. MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 107; Vicki
Schultz, Life’s Work, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1881, 1892 (2000); Williams, supra note 190, at 2239–40.
Alternatively, high-status wives shift the burden of gender inequality to other low-class women, to
whom they assign the domestic responsibilities their husbands “delegate” to them, a solution that
has turned “a gender problem into a class problem and has been a source of considerable hostility
to feminism.” Williams, supra note 190, at 2237 n.40; see also Fineman, supra note 180, at 2209.
Meanwhile, in lower status families, where men often work in low prestige jobs that erode their
dignity and threaten their masculinity, husbands tend to adhere especially strictly to traditional sex
roles and to renounce domestic responsibilities at home. Williams, supra note 190, at 2242–43.
This dynamic, in turn, pressures wives to select low-status, low-paid occupations to enhance their
husbands’ sense of self-worth. See OKIN, supra note 4, at 153; Williams, supra note 190, at 2244–45.
RHODE, supra note 164, at 133.
See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 4, at 123 (stating that most wives are constrained in their opportunities in
the labor force by what is required of them at home); Kelly, supra note 197, at 126 (detailing the
various sacrifices women make in the labor force to support husbands’ market participation, which
significantly erode their power in both the market and home, while enhancing their husbands’);
Wax, supra note 2, at 546 (stating that women’s labor market value tends to be impaired by
marriage); Williams, supra note 190, at 2245 (finding that while marriage enhances men’s market
potential, it erodes women’s).
Williams, supra note 190, at 2245. See generally Jane Friesen, Alternative Economic Perspectives on the Use
of Labor Market Policies to Redress the Gender Gap in Compensation, 82 GEO. L.J. 31, 39 (1993) (“When the
gender wage gap is decomposed in the usual way, the differential effects of marital status account
for about one-third of the unexplained portion of the mean differential between men’s and women’s
earnings.”).

500

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

[Vol. 22:2

b. Decisionmaking Power
While women’s disproportionate investment in the work of the home is a
“major indicator” of marital inequality,224 it is not the sole measure.
Decisionmaking power is another important factor, which usually correlates
with earnings and job prestige. Consequently, status disparities between
husbands and wives in society at large significantly influence negotiation
dynamics within marriages. As a result, the diminished agency of women
within the average marriage is pervasive among decision-making roles within
the home.225 Men almost universally enjoy greater bargaining power in the
marriage, rendering women unequal, lower status partners.226
Studies indicate that employed husbands consistently enjoy the greatest
say in all aspects of their marriages, homemakers have the least, and even
employed wives seldom have as much say as their husbands.227 When
married women become mothers, they tend to suffer an additional decline in
influence.228
Even where wives earn substantially more than their husbands, however,
husbands still tend to enjoy greater say in financial matters.229 As researchers
224
225
226

227

228

229

STEIL, supra note 178, at 54, 66.
Id.
Sociological studies since the 1960s have documented that “power within the family generally tracks
power outside it.” See Joan Williams, Toward a Reconstructive Feminism: Reconstructing the Relationship of
Market Work and Family Work, 19 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 89, 154 (1998) (arguing that gender norms in
parenting link caregiving roles with disempowerment in the family); see also Marsha Garrison,
Autonomy or Community? An Evaluation of Two Models of Parental Obligation, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 41, 107
(1998) (stating that “the typical American husband continues to have more power within marriage
than his wife”); Kelly, supra note 197, at 135 (stating that sex-differentiated roles that persist in
marriage erode women’s power in the market and at home, while allowing men greater earning
power that can translate into more muscle in intra-family money matters); Wax, supra note 2, at
513 (recounting that husbands on average have more power and are in a position to “get their way”
more often).
STEIL, supra note 178, at 29–30; June Carbone, Has the Gender Divide Become Unbridgeable? The
Implications for Social Equality, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 31, 79–80 (2001) (“Studies show that the
level of equality in marriage reflects the parties’ relative earning capacity.”); Janice M. Steil & Beth
A. Turetsky, Is Equal Better? The Relationship Between Marital Equality and Psychological Symptomatology, 7
APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. ANN. 73 (1987); Williams, supra note 190, at 2288 (stating that feminist
work establishes that men’s greater power in the market results in greater power within the family).
STEIL, supra note 178, at 16, 18, 22, 28–29 (noting that family size is associated with marital power;
mothers have the least equal relationships, whereas wives with no or few children have more
influence).
Studies have indicated that husbands tended to have the final say in major decisions, that wives
tended to characterize their husbands as “the real boss in the family,” and that unemployed wives
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have been forced to conclude, the persistence of the provider complex, which
conceptualizes men as primary breadwinners, still works to maintain male
domination within modern marriages,230 and so women’s economic gains in
the workplace have not translated into commensurate gains at home, even
though earning power normally increases bargaining power.231
c. Domestic Abuse
Another gauge of marital inequality is physical disempowerment: the use
of force by a spouse to establish authority over the other. Domestic violence
and sexual abuse are the ultimate acts of inequality in marriage, both a
symptom and a cause of spousal subordination.232 There is dramatic gender
asymmetry in the incidence of violence between husbands and wives—the
vast majority of victims are women.233 Estimates suggest that over one third

230

231

232

233

were more likely to report husbandly dominance in decision making than employed wives. See id.
at 55–57 (summarizing numerous studies assessing marital power measured by decision-making
say). See also DiFonzo & Stern, supra note 16, at 3 (reviewing the state of contemporary marriage
and concluding that, while some aspects of marriage have dramatically changed, others—especially
traditional gender norms—have stubbornly resisted alteration, and that “[m]ost importantly, men
tend to retain their financial hegemony, both over women in general and over wives in particular.”).
See, e.g., OKIN, supra note 4, at 95, 141 (arguing that the economic dependence of women on men
and the emphasis society places on economic success reinforces power imbalances in marital
relationships); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 73 (“The provider role translates into diffuse power
within the family and creates inequality between husbands and wives.”); STEIL, supra note 178, at
84–85; Kelly, supra note 197, at 127 (noting that the reason women may enjoy less power at home
is not necessarily the result of less market power, but “a reflection of gender ideologies embedded
in society and manifested in marriage”); id. at 128 (“One obvious explanation for uneven
distribution of work and power for some couples is the continued subordination of women.”).
OKIN, supra note 4, at 159 (noting that the male-provider ideology sometimes overwhelms women’s
workplace successes in influencing the distribution of power in marriage); STEIL, supra note 178, at
49; Wax, supra note 2, at 593.
Wife-beating in the family setting builds on traditional assumptions about gender roles and in turn
reflects and reinforces other patterns of gender inequality. See RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 62
(arguing that domestic violence follows other forms of domination because primarily husbands are
the perpetrators and wives are the victims); Eppler, supra note 120, at 790–91 n.14 (“Feminist
scholars have persuasively argued that woman battering is . . . a graphic and explicit demonstration
of men’s domination over women.”); Kenneth Karst, Sources of Status-Harm and Group Disadvantage in
Private Behavior, 2 ISSUES LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP 13 (2002) (emphasis in original) (“Within the private
zone of the intimate relationship, however, power is being exercised when a man beats his wife.”).
See MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 132 (stating that, according to a survey of Oklahomans, forty-four
percent of women as opposed to eight percent of men identify domestic violence as a factor leading
to their divorce); Ariella Hyman, Dean Schillinger & Bernard Lo, Laws Mandating Reporting of
Domestic Violence: Do They Promote Patient Well-being?, 273 J. AM. MED. ASS’N 1781, 1781 (1995)
(reporting findings that ninety to ninety-five percent of domestic violence victims are women). For
a review of domestic violence acts, which indicate the grossly disproportionate risk of violence for
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of married women have experienced some form of physical abuse234 and
“[a]s many as one in seven women have been raped by their husbands.”235
Of the women who eventually divorce, more than two-thirds leave behind
violent husbands.236
The psychological and sociological literatures explain wife battering as a
way of displaying power in a marriage, a tool to “effect total domination of a
woman by a man,”237 to accomplish goals, and to guarantee female
submissiveness.238 In fact, scholars have urged that the gender-neutral term
“domestic violence” be replaced with “patriarchal violence” because the
phenomenon is inherently connected to “sexism, to sexist thinking, and to
male dominance.”239 The research on marital rape also confirms that it is
used as a symbol of a husband’s control over his wife240 and is “only

234

235

236
237
238

239

240

women, see Molly Dragiewicz & Yvonne Lindgren, The Gendered Nature of Domestic Violence: Statistical
Data for Lawyers Considering Equal Protection Analysis, 17 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 229, 245–
56 (2009) (asserting that women face a grossly disproportionate risk of violence from male partners).
See Martha R. Mahoney, Exit: Power and the Idea of Leaving in Love, Work, and the Confirmation Hearings,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1283, 1288 n.16 (1992) (“The rate of physical abuse in marriage has been
estimated by Lenore Walker and other experts at about 50%, though the lowest recent estimate is
12% and the highest is 60%.”); Statistics, NAT’L COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE,
https://ncadv.org/statistics (last visited Feb. 7, 2020).
See KATHA POLLITT, REASONABLE CREATURES: ESSAYS ON WOMEN AND FEMINISM 6 (1994).
Battering often includes violent sexual assaults. See DAVID FINKELHOR & KERSTI YLLO, LICENSE
TO RAPE: SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIVES 6–7 (1985); DIANA RUSSELL, RAPE IN MARRIAGE 87–101
(1990); McConnell, supra note 111, at 230 n.128 (“[O]ne out of ten wives has been sexually assaulted
at least once by her husband.”); see also RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 82 (stating that sexual abuse
of women in marriage is “[f]ar from a rare event” because wives are considered the “sexual property
of husbands.”).
DEMIE KURZ, FOR RICHER FOR POORER: MOTHERS CONFRONT DIVORCE 53, 56, 59 (1995);
Nichols, supra note 20, at 943.
McConnell, supra note 111, at 233.
Eppler, supra note 120, at 791 n.14 (stating that domestic violence is a “violent manifestation of the
patriarchal beliefs that men have the right to dominate, control, and rule over women . . . [as] the
‘property’ or ‘possession’ of men.”); see also Mahoney, supra note 234, at 1304 (“Separation assault
. . . shows that batterers do not stop seeking power and control merely because the woman has left
the relationship.”); Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation,
90 MICH. L. REV. 1, 53 (1991) (“Battering is about domination. . . .”).
See Anat First & Michal Agmon-Gonnen, Is a Man’s Car More Important Than a Battered Woman’s Body?
Human Rights and Punishment for Violent Crimes Against Female Spouses, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 135, 138
(2009).
See ELIZABETH A. STANKO, INTIMATE INTRUSIONS: WOMEN’S EXPERIENCE OF MEN’S
VIOLENCE 9 (1985); McConnell, supra note 111, at 231–32 (arguing that sexual assault in a
relationship is symbolic of the man’s domination of the woman); Angie Perone, Unchain My Heart:
Slavery as a Defense to the Dismantling of the Violence Against Women Act, 17 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 115,
135–36 (2006) (marital rape is a common method of exerting domination over an abused wife);
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peripherally about sex.”241 Moreover, some scholars view wife rape and
battering as a bias crime motivated by a desire “to punish the victim in order
to further subordinate the victim’s group based on negative views of
them.”242 The cumulative effect of the persistent threat of male violence is
to subordinate not only an individual wife, but all women.243
Strikingly, study after study exposes wife battering as a means to enforce
women’s traditional roles and other patterns of gender inequality.244 Indeed,
the typical batterer has been revealed to be “a traditionalist, believing in male
supremacy, the stereotyped masculine sex role in the family, and his
entitlement to use violence to discipline his wife.”245 Husbands who batter
rationalize their violence towards their wives by stressing women’s traditional
roles,246 and tend to focus on their victims’ “failure to fulfill obligations of a
good wife”247 with complaints that range from the deficient performance of

241
242
243

244

245

246
247

Kathleen Waits, Battered Women and Their Children: Lessons From One Woman’s Story, 35 HOUS. L. REV.
29, 40 (1998) (describing one domestic violence victim’s experience of sexual assault as her
husband’s way of punishing her).
FINKELHOR & YLLO, supra note 235, at 18. But see CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, FEMINISM
UNMODIFIED: DISCOURSES ON LIFE AND LAW 86–87 (1987).
Kristin L. Taylor, Treating Male Violence Against Women as a Bias Crime, 76 B.U. L. REV. 575, 595
(1996).
Id. at 586, 596–97; Tania Tetlow, Discriminatory Acquittal, 18 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 75, 90, 95
(2009) (arguing that private violence enforces gender inequities); Beverly Balos, Domestic Violence
Matters: The Case for Appointed Counsel in Protective Order Proceedings, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 557,
574 (2006) (noting that even though violence is targeted at an individual wife, “it also has the effect
of enforcing gender roles . . . [and] gender hierarchy.”); see also Dragiewicz & Lindgren, supra note
233, at 263–66 (reviewing how courts, the legislatures, and Congress have all identified domestic
violence as gender discrimination).
Domestic and sexual violence is rooted in and reflects the legacy of sex discrimination. See, e.g.,
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN & FEMINIST LAWMAKING 13–20 (2000)
(analyzing historical perspectives of domestic and sexual violence); Linda L. Ammons, What’s God
Got to Do With It? Church and State Collaboration in the Subordination of Women and Domestic Violence, 51
RUTGERS L. REV. 1207, 1219 (1999) (noting the strong link between male supremacy and battered
wives); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J. 1281, 1301
(1991) (“Women are sexually assaulted because they are women: not individually or at random, but
on the basis of sex, because of their membership in a group defined by gender.”).
Malinda L. Seymore, Isn’t it a Crime: Feminist Perspectives on Spousal Immunity and Spousal Violence, 90
NW. U.L. REV. 1032, 1039–41 (1996) (profiling the batterer husband). See also Taylor, supra note
242, at 595 (“Many clinical studies suggest that men who use violence against their intimate
partners idealize a rigid patriarchal family unit and have restricted and stereotypical views of their
masculine role.”).
Mahoney, supra note 234, at 1304; Mahoney, supra note 238, at 54–55.
James Ptacek, Why Do Men Batter Their Wives, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON WIFE ABUSE 133, 147
(Raquel Kennedy Bergen ed., 1998) (quoting MICHELE BOGRAD, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE:
PERCEPTIONS OF BATTERED WOMEN, ABUSIVE MEN, AND NON-VIOLENT MEN AND WOMEN
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domestic tasks to refusing sex.248 In other words, non-compliance with
gender roles offends batterers’ sense of male entitlement so severely as to
legitimize the abuse as a disciplinary measure to put women in their place249
and signal that male prerogatives have been wrongfully revoked. 250
Wife battering has indeed proven so effective in coercing domestic and
sexual services through degradation and subjection that many scholars have
proffered that violent marriages effect not simply gender subordination, but
even involuntary servitude implicating the Thirteenth Amendment.251
***
We have observed that contemporary marriages are still rife with gender
injustice and inequalities that demean women and compromise their
citizenship stature. Wives are saddled with the vast majority of unpaid, lowstatus domestic and caretaking work, tend to defer to their husbands when
major decisions must be made, and all too often are subject to husbands who
use violence to establish and enforce their dominance. As a result, women
as a group are still systematically below men along important dimensions of
social welfare, especially income, wealth, and political power;252 these groupbased disparities forcefully bear on the question of second-class citizenship.
Put differently, the marital inequality that still plagues contemporary

248

249
250
251

252

(1986)) (emphasis removed); ELIJAH ANDERSON, CODE OF THE STREET: DECENCY, VIOLENCE,
AND THE MORAL LIFE OF THE INNER CITY 189 (1999) (“When men do get married and are unable
to establish domestic control, physical abuse sometimes follows.”); MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 139;
RHODE, supra note 164, at 238; Katharine K. Baker, Dialectics and Domestic Abuse, 110 YALE L.J.
1459, 1487 (2001) (reviewing ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, BATTERED WOMEN AND FEMINIST
LAWMAKING (2000)).
LEWIS OKUN, WOMAN ABUSE: FACTS REPLACING MYTHS 69–70 (1986); Rhonda Copelon,
Recognizing the Egregious in Everyday Life: Domestic Violence as Torture, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV.
291, 335–36 (1994); PAUL KIVEL, MEN’S WORK: HOW TO STOP THE VIOLENCE THAT TEARS
OUR LIVES APART 200 (1992); Lisa E. Martin, Providing Equal Justice for the Domestic Violence Victim:
Due Process and the Victim’s Right to Counsel, 34 GONZ. L. REV. 329, 332 (1999) (noting that in a typical
case, a battered woman is beaten because her housekeeping skills did not meet her abuser’s
expectations).
ANDERSON, supra note 247, at 183, 189; MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 139; RHODE, supra note 164, at
238; Baker, supra note 247, at 1487.
Seymore, supra note 245, at 1039.
After all, as Akhil Reed Amar put it, “[a]t its core, slavery is a system of domination, degradation
and subordination, in which some people are allowed in effect to treat other persons—other human
beings with God-given rights—as property rather than persons.” Akhil Reed Amar, Remember the
Thirteenth, 10 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 405 (1993); see also id. at 408 (analyzing domestic abuse
through a Thirteenth Amendment lens); Perone, supra note 240, at 133, 136 (same); McConnell,
supra note 111, at 233, 239–43 (same).
Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2448–49 (1994).
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marriages implicates not only women’s private family lives, but also their
prospects for enjoying equal citizenship stature in society.
Our analysis thus far has derived from a close reading of marriage as it
is and has been lived by women. The next Section looks at the lived
experience of marital freedom by examining women’s divorce accounts. As
it will show, from the standpoint of women themselves, inequality in
marriage is often so pervasive and so costly to well-being that it functions as
a major motivating force behind their decision to divorce. Moreover, as they
testify, divorce for many women has indeed constituted a valuable means for
tackling experiences with marital subordination and “dual sovereignty.”
C. Divorce: A “Self-Defense” Remedy to Marital Subordination
This Section aims to demonstrate how divorce can ameliorate gender
stratification and the subordination of women. First, it identifies marital
inequality as a primary cause of female-initiated divorce. Second, it analyzes
evidence suggesting that divorce is a promising anti-subordinationist remedy
against dual sovereignty and as a pathway towards dignity, self-esteem,
independence, and ultimately full membership in society.
1. Female Divorce Accounts: Stories of Subordination, Degradation, and
Devaluation
With apologies to Leo Tolstoy,253 the divorce literature shows that
Vladimir Nabokov had it right: “All happy families are more or less
dissimilar; all unhappy ones are more or less alike.”254 Divorcing families in
the contemporary United States resemble one another in their failure to
constitute relationships among equal partners.255 Women of all backgrounds
and across lines of race and class define good marriage as a partnership of
equals,256 yet divorce memoirs reveal the abysmal failure to attain gender

253
254
255
256

LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (George Gibian ed., Maude trans., 1995) (“All happy families
resemble one another, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”).
VLADIMIR NABOKOV, ADA OR ARDOR: A FAMILY CHRONICLE 3 (1969).
Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1979 (2000).
As Kathryn Edin testified before Congress, women seek self-government in marriage and an equal
partnership, not subservience:
[Men] think that piece of paper says they own you. You are their personal slave. Cook
their meals, clear their house, do their laundry. . . . A man gets married to have somebody
take care of them . . . .
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equality in modern marriages. As this Subsection will show, it is women’s
sense of subordination and devaluation in marriage and their growing
distaste for marital inequality that has been the primary impetus for a
phenomenon this Article terms the “feminization of divorce.” That is,
women initiate two-thirds to three-quarters of divorces in the United
States,257 whether the divorce initiation is defined in terms of “who wanted
to leave the marriage first” or “who actually filed for divorce.”258 This
national trend is only increasing over time,259 turning marital inequality into
“the most potent and ominous threat” to the integrity of the institution of
modern marriage.260
One of the first to study divorce from the perspective of divorce
“veterans” themselves, Catharine Riessman has investigated the interpretive
process through which divorcees make sense of their former marriages. She
found that “[d]ivorcing women remember marriage as anything but

257

258

259

260

Most mothers don’t want to be owned or slave for their husband. They want a
partnership of equals.
Welfare and Marriage Issues: Hearing Before the House Subcomm. on Human Res. of the Comm. on Ways and
Means, 107th Cong. 76–82 (2001) (testimony of Kathryn Edin, Assoc. Professor of Soc., Inst. of
Pol’y Res., Nw. Univ.) (internal quotations omitted).
Researchers have consistently found that wives have almost always sought divorce in greater
numbers than their husbands. Starting in the eighteenth century, women divorce seekers
outnumbered men. See RILEY, supra note 142, at 16, 147. By the end of the nineteenth century,
the percentage of divorces awarded to wives rose to two-thirds. See RODERICK PHILLIPS, PUTTING
ASUNDER: A HISTORY OF DIVORCE IN WESTERN SOCIETY 228 (1988); Margaret F. Brinig &
Douglas W. Allen, “These Boots are Made for Walking”: Why Most Divorce Filers are Women, 2 AM. L. &
ECON. REV. 126, 126–28, 154 (2000).
ALISON CLARKE-STEWART & CORNELIA BRENTANO, DIVORCE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
53–54 (2006); Sanford L. Braver, Marnie Whitely & Christine Ng, Who Divorced Whom?
Methodological and Theoretical Issues, 20 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (1993).
Cahn, supra note 126, at 233; see also Michael J. Rosenfeld, Who Wants the Breakup? Gender and Breakup
in Heterosexual Couples, in SOCIAL NETWORKS AND THE LIFE COURSE: INTEGRATING THE
DEVELOPMENT OF HUMAN LIVES AND SOCIAL RELATIONAL NETWORKS 221 (Duane F. Alwin,
Diane Helen Felmlee & Derek A. Kreager eds., 2017). Remarkably, the feminization of divorce
has been a phenomenon shared virtually everywhere in the Western world. PHILLIPS, supra note
257, at 228; Andrew Adonis, Britain in Focus: Wives Bring Most Divorces, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1996,
at 10 (“Many more divorces are granted to the wife than to the husband, and this is particularly so
where the couple have children.”). This is, for example, the case in England and Australia. See
DAVIS & MURCH, supra note 130, at 32–34. This is also the case in Israel. See Karin Carmit Yefet,
Unchaining the Agunot: Enlisting the Israeli Constitution in the Service of Women's Marital Freedom, 20 Yale J.L.
& Fem. 441, 451(2009); see also Patricia L. Sullivan, Culture, Divorce, and Family Mediation in Hong Kong,
43 FAM. CT. REV. 109, 116 (2005) (demonstrating that most divorces in China are initiated by
women).
Wax, supra note 2, at 672.
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equal”261 and “vividly describe in their accounts how they are financially,
psychologically, and physically dominated by their husbands.”262 While
individual women, of course, experience substantial differences in the
amount and forms of inequality in their marriages, most of the divorced
women in Riessman’s, and in later studies, explain their decision to divorce
through these experiences, intimating that gender equality and marital
dignity are a prerequisite for a viable marriage.263
Among the most common forms of subordination that divorced women
cite as triggers of marital breakdown are instances in which they are devalued
and discredited for their work in and outside the home as well as for their
cognitive abilities.264 Divorce accounts confirm that women’s employment,
in particular, is a major source of friction in many marriages.265 While work
is the strongest predictor of women’s good health and the basis for their
identity and mobility in the world at large,266 far more than marriage or
children,267 it also causes many husbands psychological distress, lower selfesteem, and depression. Even men who espouse egalitarian beliefs about
women’s roles often perceive their wives’ employment as “against their
261
262
263

264
265

266

267

RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 57 (summarizing divorced women’s accounts of their marriages under
the heading “Inequality: Women’s Memories of Devaluation and Subordination.”).
Id. at 73.
Starting in the 1970s, many books analyzing divorce have explained that without equality and
mutual commitment, marriages are doomed to become a “divorce statistic.” See the many sources
cited by RILEY, supra note 142, at 177; Steven Ozment, Marriage Was Having a Rough Time, in
MARRIAGE: JUST A PIECE OF PAPER? 229 (Katherine Anderson, Don Browning & Brian Boyer
eds., 2002); ANDREW HACKER, MISMATCH: THE GROWING GULF BETWEEN WOMEN AND MEN
7 (2003).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 59.
Id. at 51; NAPIER, supra note 193, at 132–33 (explaining that women’s economic power often leads
to conflict within marriage and many researchers explain the increase in divorce in recent decades
as directly related to women’s employment).
The role of paid worker has proven extremely beneficial to women’s well-being across both race
and class lines; it is a source of: psychological and social support; independent identity; increased
self-esteem; purposefulness; enhanced social contacts and inherent interests; and a sense of wellbeing because of their financial contribution to the family welfare. See, e.g., STEIL, supra note 178,
at 17–20 (providing a review of the research literature); Rosalind C. Barnett & Grace K. Baruch,
Women’s Involvement in Multiple Roles and Psychological Distress, 49 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
135, 136–37 (1985) (arguing that among employed women, overload and conflict “may be less
strongly associated and conflict may be less strongly associated with psychological symptomatology
than among nonemployed women”).
APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 110; FALUDI, supra note 196, at 39 (recounting that as early as the
1950s, two-thirds of married women noted that what gave them a sense of purpose and self-worth
was their jobs; by the 1980s, the number had risen to 87%).
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interests” because it directs wives’ focus away from their husbands, lessens
men’s control in marriage, and puts pressure on them to do more household
work.268 Accordingly, many women’s divorce accounts recount husbands’
attempts to usurp women’s place in the public sphere by withholding support
from their careers—or their plans to enter the labor market or return to
school—or by demanding that they resign or cut back their hours.269 Forced
to choose between their job and their marriage, many women chose
divorce.270
The unequal division of labor is another theme that figures prominently
in women’s accounts of marital dissatisfaction and dissolution.271 Even many
divorced men, reflecting upon their dissolved marriages, regret having taken
their wives’ labor for granted272 and their own shirking of household
responsibilities.273
Divorced women also attested to more flagrant
manifestations of marital inequality, recalling efforts at economic and
psychological domination by their husbands.274 Many complained about
268

269

270

271

272
273
274

See RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 54–55 (documenting the same in the 1980s); LILLIAN B. RUBIN,
WORLDS OF PAIN: LIFE IN THE WORKING-CLASS FAMILY 171–84 (1976) (documenting this
phenomenon in the 1970s); STEIL, supra note 178, at 20 (documenting the same in the 1990s).
Divorce researchers find that since women’s participation in the workforce has increased, a new
cause of divorce has been lack of husbandly support for women’s careers. See CLARKE-STEWART
& BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 44–45 (“Women also complained specifically about their
husbands’ lack of support for their careers—a new reason for divorce that has appeared since
women became more involved in the workforce.”); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 53–56 (analyzing
husbands’ lack of enthusiasm for wives’ employment).
Many women, however, make a different choice. “Over and over, women from working-class
marriages report that their husbands ‘said no’” and some wives “went along with husbands’
directives in order to keep peace at home.” RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 60. Indeed, research
evidence suggests that despite women’s conviction that they are entitled to marital equality in the
home, they are also generally hesitant to press their desire for egalitarian marriage because they
want to avoid conflict. MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 145.
CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 45; DONNA L. FRANKLIN, WHAT’S LOVE
GOT TO DO WITH IT? UNDERSTANDING AND HEALING THE RIFT BETWEEN BLACK MEN AND
WOMEN 210 (2000) (studying twenty-first century black families where both spouses work and
reporting that “the issue of male dominance remains one of the primary sources of tension in black
marriages”); HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 177, at 249–50; RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at
97; Michelle L. Frisco & Kristi Williams, Perceived Housework Equity, Marital Happiness, and Divorce in
Dual-Earner Households, 24 J. FAM. ISSUES 51, 69–71 (2003) (analyzing the relationship between
perceived equity in relationships and marital happiness).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 56.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 59–60 (noting that “living in tyranny” was an experience common to both low- and middleclass women, though its manifestations tended to be somewhat subtler for the latter); FALUDI, supra
note 196, at xvi (noting that many wives complained of “male mistreatment, unequal relationship,
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their economic subordination within marriage and dependency on
husbands, which reduced their voice and limited their bargaining power in
the home.275 Ex-wives recalled their husbands’ control over finances and
attempts to exert power over the full array of domestic decisions.276 As
women perceived it, “husbands both demean[ed] their domesticity and
tr[ied] to dominate it, often at the same time.”277 In making sense of their
own divorces, some men corroborated female stories of control and admitted
to having acted as “much of a demagogue,” a “dictator,” or “order[ing] her
around like a little Hitler.”278
Finally, physical and sexual violence continually reappear in women’s
divorce accounts as the most severe expression of their husbands’ control.279
During the marriage, abusive husbands would reiterate “their need to
control or dominate the female, their belief that female independence meant
loss of male control, and their attempt to persuade or coerce the female into
adopting their definition of how the relationship should be structured and
how it should function.”280 These husbands used violence to punish women

275

276

277
278
279

280

and male efforts to… ‘keep women down.’”); Fineman, supra note 5, at 248 (“There were real
injustices within the hierarchical and patriarchal family, exemplified by the economic inequities
that emerged with divorce reform and the prevalence of physical and psychological abuse of
women.”).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 61 (observing that in making themselves economically beholden to
their husbands, women become subordinate to them); OKIN, supra note 4, at 151–52 (analyzing the
effects of wives’ economic dependence on their husbands).
For example, husbands controlled decisions ranging “from the kind of food that would be served
and which purchases would be made, to how wives used their time, to what religion they would
practice.” RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 59; see also Finola O. Riagain, Reasons for Martial Instability
and Separation, in DIVORCE? FACING THE ISSUES OF MARITAL BREAKDOWN 25, 32 (Mags O’Brien
ed., 1995) (reporting “many cases in which the pattern of money management within marriage
gives rise to serious inequalities and even hardship, especially for women”).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 59.
Id.
Naomi R. Cahn, Civil Images of Battered Women: The Impact of Domestic Violence on Child Custody Decisions,
44 VAND. L. REV. 1041, 1043 n.6 (1991) (reporting that 95% of divorcing women alleged cruelty,
usually in the form of ongoing physical abuse, under fault divorce (citing Herma Hill Kay, An
Appraisal of California’s No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CALIF. L. REV. 291, 297 (1987)); Mahoney, supra note
234, at 1288; Linda C. McClain, The “Male Problematic” and the Problems of Family Law: A Response to
Don Browning’s “Critical Familism,” 56 EMORY L.J. 1407, 1422 (2007) (identifying violence as a
significant factor leading to divorce); Lynn Hecht Schafran, Gender Bias in the Courts, in WOMEN AS
SINGLE PARENTS: CONFRONTING INSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS IN THE COURTS, THE
WORKPLACE, AND THE HOUSING MARKET 39, 59 (Elizabeth A. Mulroy ed., 1988) (arguing that
domestic violence is often what leads a woman into divorce); Singer, supra note 168, at 1547.
DONALD G. DUTTON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 64 (1995).
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for violating traditional gender roles,281 or whenever they felt distress over
status erosion within the family—evoked, for example, by wives’ higher
earnings or by becoming unemployed.282
In sum, many women’s, and even men’s, explanations of divorce expose
modern marriages as rife with gender injustices that undermine women's
dignity and equality in and outside the home. For divorcing women, staying
married represented ongoing subservience, while getting divorced
constituted their resistance to subordination, domestic violence, and the
“stalled sex-role revolution at home.”283 To this we now turn.
2. “His” and “Her” Divorce: From Private Patriarchy to Gender Emancipation
Since wives and husbands experience marriage so differently, it should
come as no surprise that just as there is a “his” and “her” marriage, there is
also “his” and “her” divorce. And “her” divorce is much better than “his.”284
The divorce literature consistently finds that women, far from losing their
identity without marriage, fare significantly better than when they were

281

282

283

284

VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN’S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC EQUALITY 74 (1988); Joanna Bunker
Rohrbaugh, Domestic Violence in Same-Gender Relationships, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 287, 292 (2006) (arguing
that wife battering “is related to rigid gender roles because men who beat their wives or girlfriends
often ‘engage in a coherent and disciplined rage to defend what they consider to be their rights,’
which the men construe to be absolute authority over ‘their’ women”). See generally Matthew
Jakupcak et al., The Role of Masculine Ideology and Masculine Gender Role Stress in Men’s Perpetuation of
Relationship Violence, 3 PSYCHOL. MEN & MASCULINITY 97 (2002).
For example, one study on the attitudes of low-income African-American young men found that
they aspire to a marital ideal where they provide for and protect their family in exchange for being
“the undisputed head of the household” who is in charge of making “the major decisions concerning
the family,” and that inability to be a “patriarch in the home” leads to troubling consequences:
“[w]hen men marry and are unable to establish domestic control, physical abuse sometimes
follows.” ANDERSON, supra note 247, at 189; MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 139. Indeed, other studies
reported that physical violence was twice as high in families with an unemployed husband and
working wife than in families in which both spouses or only the husband was employed.
HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 177, at 36; Deborah M. Weissman, The Personal is Political—
and Economic: Rethinking Domestic Violence, 2007 BYU L. REV. 387, 419–30 (examining how loss of
employment and subsequent failure to live up to prescribed gender roles relate to occurrence of
domestic violence).
Edin, supra note 11, at 130; see also Joshua Cohen, The Arc of the Moral Universe, 26 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
91, 93–94 (1997) (suggesting that human moral and emotional makeup is such that a group’s
chronic experience of relative powerlessness within a basic social institution must inevitably lead to
a recognition of injustice and a rebellion against it).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 15. This is also a foundational theme of HETHERINGTON & KELLY,
supra note 177, at ch. 2 (titled “The His and Her Marriage; The His and Her Divorce”).
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married.285 As one divorce scholar put it, whereas men tend to feel “whole
in marriage and half a self without it,” women tend to feel more whole after
divorce.286 Women’s divorce accounts speak volumes about how the right to
marital freedom remedies subordination, enhances women’s capacities for
personal self-government, and even contributes to co-sovereignty with
husbands in subsequent remarriages.
In her research on divorced women, Cutting Loose: Why Women Who End
Their Marriages Do So Well, Ashton Applewhite reports that the women in her
study were unanimous in their happiness about getting divorced;287 the more
time passed the happier they became and the more conviction they felt that
divorce was the right decision.288 In fact, almost all the women in the study
regretted that they had stayed married as long as they did.289 These findings
are remarkable given that many women in the study faced considerable
financial hardship, yet even the neediest among them reported that their
overall situation improved after divorce290 and that the pleasures of being
self-sufficient overwhelmed material loss.291 Indeed, even Lenore Weitzman,
who famously documented the feminization of poverty among divorced
women, could not find women who regretted the decision to exit.292
The word “freedom” surfaces repeatedly in women’s divorce accounts293
to convey wives’ sense of escape from subordination to husbands and to

285
286
287
288

289
290
291
292

293

CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 100; RIANE TENNENHAUS EISLER,
DISSOLUTION: NO-FAULT DIVORCE, MARRIAGE, AND THE FUTURE OF WOMEN 136, 139 (1977).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 197; see also NAPIER, supra note 193, at 126, 272.
APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at xv, 27 (women take charge of their lives after divorce and emerge
“stronger, clearer, and infinitely happier”); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at ix.
See APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 165–67; FALUDI, supra note 196, at 26 (stating that the “nation’s
largest study on the long-term effects of divorce found that five years after divorce, two-thirds of the
women were happier with their lives, and after ten years 80 percent of women thought divorce was
the right decision.”).
APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 24.
Id. at 28, 98–99 (“One [woman] after another described living on less but having it feel like more”);
see also id. at 125.
Id. at 29, 122 (divorced women’s “reduced circumstances translated into a better quality of life.”).
WEITZMAN, supra note 138, at 346 (“Even the longer-married older housewives who suffer the
greatest financial hardships after divorce (and who feel most economically deprived, most angry,
and most ‘cheated’ by the divorce settlement) say they are ‘personally’ better off than they were
during marriage. . . . They also report improved self-esteem, more pride in their appearance and
greater competence in all aspects of their lives.”).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 165.
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evoke their ongoing path to autonomy and self-realization.294 Working- and
middle-class women alike describe divorce as “liberation,” “control,” and
“independence,”295 and as an instrument allowing them “the freedom to be
myself,” to be “more like a free person,” to “liv[e] again,” and to feel
“energized and liberated.”296 The language of freedom is particularly
pronounced among women who escape domestic violence, but even escape
from subtler forms of male authority is celebrated.297
Women’s frequent invocation of the terminology of freedom complements their perception of their marriages as “filled with constraint,
subservience, and vulnerability to the authority of husbands.”298 By using
this vocabulary, divorced women were:
making a connection between what their marriages were like and what their
lives are like now. As they understand it, marriage brought subordination
and divorce brings freedom. They revel in a new sense of ownership of
themselves. Despite all the hardships—economic strain, role strain, and
loneliness—women . . . experience more control than ever before over a
variety of aspects of their lives and, concomitantly, a seeming zest and
delight.299

Indeed, women described marital exit as an opportunity to “take back”
their lives and realize their full potential,300 as a “gateway to pathways
associated with joy, satisfaction and attainments.”301 Most women indeed
succeeded in carving out lives of “unparalleled productivity and richness, on
their own terms.”302 In particular, divorced women tend to experience
growth in three general areas: competence in the management of daily life,
a fuller sense of identity, and development of social relationships.303
294
295
296
297
298
299
300

301
302
303

Id. at 165–67, 205 (women view divorce as freedom from husbands’ dominance); Elizabeth S. Scott,
Divorce, Children’s Welfare, and the Culture Wars, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 95, 109 (2001).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 165.
Id. at 165, 167.
Id. at 166–67 (noting women’s deep appreciation of the pleasures of their new-found freedom).
Id. at 167; APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at xv (women “came to realize that traditional marriage
serves the husband, the wife serves the marriage – and that independence beat servitude.”).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 165.
APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 1–4 (divorce is an experience that proved liberating for women and
brings opportunities for personal growth); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 165 (discussing the
liberating effect of divorce on bringing out control and independence).
HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 177, at 280.
APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at xvi.
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 163; see also id. at 177–78 (divorce made women grow beyond the
“childlike dependency” that marriage engenders and they “repeatedly use metaphors of maturation
to describe themselves” in the post-divorce life); JUDITH S. WALLERSTEIN & JOAN B. KELLY,
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With respect to competence in the management of daily life, divorced
women experience more personal autonomy, self-sufficiency, and personal
growth than married women.304 Divorced women report moving past their
dependency on husbands and gaining feelings of efficacy, confidence, and
self-respect.305 One recent study found that, a decade after divorce, three
quarters of divorced women experience increases in personal power, develop
independence, and even achieve financial security.306 In fact, divorced
women tend to earn more than both their married and never-married
counterparts.307 Even women who experience economic deprivation
following divorce, however, generally feel better off with less money but more
control over it.308 Ex-wives reported that divorce, or freedom from their
husbands’ authority, expanded their vision of future possibilities and
encouraged them to seize opportunities in the marketplace.309
In terms of women’s sense of identity, divorce proved a pathway for
women to fulfill themselves. Many women experienced divorce as
transformative and regenerative, as a way of asserting their possession of an
individual self, capable of acting in and on the world. For them, divorce
“defines a sense of self and leads to greater maturity and self-knowledge . . .
that is stimulating and energizing and growth-enhancing.”310 Indeed,

304
305

306
307
308
309

310

SURVIVING THE BREAKUP: HOW CHILDREN AND PARENTS COPE WITH DIVORCE 193 (2008)
(confirming that divorce resulted in positive life changes for the majority of women).
Brinig & Allen, supra note 257, at 129 n.7; Nadin F. Marks, Flying Solo at Midlife: Gender, Marital Status,
and Psychological Well-Being, 58 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 917 (1996).
ABIGAIL TRAFFORD, CRAZY TIME: SURVIVING DIVORCE AND BUILDING A NEW LIFE 163 (1984)
(“For females a sense of growth in self-esteem appears to result from the divorce. The effects of such
changes appear long-lasting”); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 168–69.
Mary E. Duffy, Carolyn Thomas & Claudia Trayner, Women’s Reflections on Divorce—10 Years Later,
23 HEALTH CARE FOR WOMEN INT’L 550 (2002).
Bernstein, supra note 186, at 178 (“[D]ivorced women earn more than both married and nevermarried women . . . .”).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 170; WHITEHEAD, supra note 140, at 53.
APPLEWHITE, supra note 16, at 129 (“Career women participating in the study tended to boost their
output, win higher performance ratings, and feel more motivated and satisfied with their jobs”
following divorce); CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 71 (finding that more than
80% of divorced mothers are employed compared with fewer than 40% before the divorce, and
women who were employed full time before divorce work even more hours after it). Many divorced
women return to school, enter the labor force, or reinvest in their careers, moves that promote
feelings of fulfillment, competence, self-esteem, and efficacy. Id. at 76–77 (discussing the positive
consequences of divorce); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 171–72 (noting that women repeatedly
make the point that paid work, unlike housework, led them to “a fuller identity as they develop[ed]
competence, confidence, and status outside the home.”).
WHITEHEAD, supra note 140, at 61.
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researchers of divorce reported that such women presented selves that
display “considerable innovation, competence, and mastery.”311 They
invoked striking metaphors of dehumanization: that of being “in a cocoon”
during marriage and of “coming out of a shell” and feeling like a “full person”
following divorce.312
In terms of their social lives, women recall constraining marital
experiences, “burying” their sociability in deference to their husbands and
interacting primarily with friends that originated in their husbands’ interests
and work.313 In their post-divorce lives, however, women tended to solidify
ties with kin, construct social networks that provide emotional and material
support, and generally diversify and intensify relationships with others.314
Notably, research indicates that individuals who have been divorced
generally go on to pursue more egalitarian intimate relationships.315 Upon
remarriage, both spouses tend to view their marital roles differently.
Remarried women tend to be psychologically and economically more
independent and assertive, and are likely to enjoy greater gender equality
and power within marriage.316 Remarried men tend to become less
traditional in their gender roles, more willing to support their wives’ interests,
and more likely to share family responsibilities.317 Remarried husbands not

311
312
313
314
315

316

317

RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 93, 176–77.
Id. at 173.
Id. at 172–74.
Id. at 172, 177, 207 (marriage imposes constraints on women’s social network that divorce eases).
CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 221–22; see also id. at 214 (most people learn
from their first marriage and divorce and do not keep on making the same mistakes). They may be
more willing to compromise and more determined to succeed in their second marriage. NIJOLE V.
BENOKRAITIS, MARRIAGES AND FAMILIES: CHANGES, CHOICES, AND CONSTRAINTS (3d ed.
1993); RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 201(highlighting research which shows that divorce transforms
remarriage in positive ways, since divorce-veterans carry into remarriage the skills and
understandings they learned from divorce); Rebecca M. Smith & Mary Anne Goslen, Self-Other
Orientation and Sex-Roles Orientation of Men and Women Who Remarry, 14 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 3
(1991).
CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 222; Karen D. Pyke, Women’s Employment as a
Gift or Burden? Marital Power Across Marriage, Divorce, and Remarriage, 8 GENDER & SOC’Y 73 (1994);
Debora P. Schneller & Joyce A. Arditti, After the Breakup: Interpreting Divorce and Rethinking Intimacy, 42
J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 1 (2004) (finding that a primary change divorcees seek in post-divorce
relationships is greater equality within relationships).
CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 222; RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 215
(divorcees view their second marriages as more egalitarian then their first unions); Smith & Goslen,
supra note 315 (remarried couples tend to be more egalitarian and more oriented to a balance
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only contribute more to housework than first husbands,318 but are also more
likely to make concessions during conflicts than they were in their first
marriage.319 Research also suggests that the distress men experience during
and after their divorce raises their awareness of their own and their wife’s
emotional needs,320 and this in turn gives wives more leverage in remarriages
than in first marriages.321 Remarriages, characterized by a more equal
division of labor and sharing of decision-making power, are thus significantly
more empowering and dignifying for women than first marriages.322
In sum, given the historical and contemporary role that marriage and
divorce have played in the lives of women, legislation that thwarts marital
exit imposes special sex-specific burdens on women and cultivates gender
hierarchy within the family. Moreover, divorce-restrictive regulations
deprive women of an important mechanism to incentivize gender equality
during marriage, as the implicit or explicit threat of exit allows women to
renegotiate the balance of power in their marriage and put pressure on
husbands to be responsive to their needs.323 Indeed, the fear that divorce

318

319
320
321
322

323

between self-interest and the other’s interest, as women began to focus more on self-interest and
the men began to focus on the other’s interest more).
Pyke, supra note 316, at 86; Karen Pyke & Scott Coltrane, Entitlement, Obligation, and Gratitude in Family
Work, 17 J. FAM. ISSUES 60, 65 (1996) (spouses in second marriages report that they share decisionmaking power and household work more equally); Smith & Goslen, supra note 315, at 14, 19, 29.
CLARKE-STEWART & BRENTANO, supra note 258, at 222.
Id. at 233 (husbands in second marriages tend to be more helpful in household labor and more
sensitive to their wife’s emotional needs than they were in first marriages).
Charles Hobart, Conflict in Remarriages, 15 J. DIVORCE & REMARRIAGE 69, 84 (1991).
FRANK F. FURSTENBERG & GRAHAM B. SPANIER, RECYCLING THE FAMILY: REMARRIAGE
AFTER DIVORCE (1987) (arguing that the balance of power between spouses shifts toward greater
gender equality in subsequent marriages, where husbands are more involved in domestic roles and
women have more say in important decisions); HETHERINGTON & KELLY, supra note 177, at 179;
MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 152; Laura Hurd Clarke, Remarriage in Later Life: Older Women’s Negotiation
of Power, Resources and Domestic Labor, 17 J. WOMEN & AGING 21 (2005).
RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 216 (noting divorce may exert various kinds of subtle pressures on
partners to change traditional rules given the availability of conjugal change); OKIN, supra note 4,
at 137 (discussing how the infeasibility of exit can impede the effectiveness of voice); Joanna
Alexandra Norland, When the Vow Breaks: Why the History of French Divorce Law Sounds a Warning About
the Implications for Women of the Contemporary American Marriage Movement, 17 WIS. WOMEN’S L.J. 321,
346 (2002) (“So long as women occupied a position of disadvantage within their marriages, divorce
represented an opportunity for leverage and self-assertion.”); Leslie Green, Rights of Exit, 4 LEGAL
THEORY 165, 171 (1998); Carrie Yodanis, Divorce Culture and Marital Gender Equality: A Cross-National
Study, 19 GENDER & SOC’Y 644, 646 (2005) (arguing that the threat of divorce serves as a “tool that
women use to secure change and greater equality in marital relationships.”).
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would force marriage to change to a more egalitarian relationship was a key
in restricting this remedy throughout history.324
The next Part takes the constitutional argument even further. It will show
that the state takes not only a passive role in private patriarchy by limiting
exit from unequal or indignifying relationships, but an active role as well,
which makes a right to liberal divorce all the more pressing a constitutional
imperative.
III. THE ROLE OF LAW IN SUPPORTING INEGALITARIAN MARRIAGE
While certainly there are many extralegal forces that fuel the systematic
gender imbalances within modern marriages,325 the law also contributes to
these gender asymmetries and to the constraints wives continue to experience
today. This Article earlier noted the law’s historical role as a cornerstone of
a larger social system supporting and legitimizing gender subordination.
Through common law and statutes, the state—as the third party to a legal
marriage—formalized gendered marital norms and expectations.326
Domestic relations laws, of course, have dramatically changed and no longer
explicitly institutionalize male supremacy. But the vestiges of patriarchal
privilege continue to hover over modern relationships, in that individual
expectations for marriage continue to be shaped by the gendered allocation
of labor the law once mandated.327 Moreover, a wide array of state laws
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327

Norma Basch, Relief in the Premises: Divorce as a Woman’s Remedy in New York and Indiana, 1815–1870, 8
L. & HIST. REV. 1, 2 (1990); see also Norland, supra note 323, at 330.
See also Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 92 (analyzing possible reasons for the persistence of
patriarchal marriages in twenty-first century United States); STEIL, supra note 178, at 101–11. See
generally Wax, supra note 2 (employing bargaining theory to analyze the many legal and extralegal
forces that are arrayed against the egalitarian ideal of marriage and that make it almost impossible
for women to obtain social equality with men).
See MARTHA MINOW, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION, AND
AMERICAN LAW 269–70 (1990); David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV.
527, 556–57 & n.150 (2000) (noting that until two decades ago many state statutes assigned
unilateral decision-making power over family matters to the husband); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family
History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135, 1139–44 (1985).
See Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189, 219 (2007) (arguing that
marriage “has been irreparably shaped” by a discriminatory legal history); OKIN, supra note 4, at
140–41.
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today still shape family life in ways that promote gender hierarchy and
demonstrate a “strong preference” for the traditional family structure.328
For example, American tax legislation, unlike the law in most developed
countries, penalized couples who challenged traditional gender roles,329 at
least until the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017.330 Dual-earner couples were
taxed at significantly higher rates than individuals who earned the same
amount, such that tax benefits in marriages were greatest when one person
was the primary wage earner.331 By penalizing a second income, and not
taxing the imputed income of stay-at-home spouses, the tax system pushed
women to work less in the market and more at home, which in turn helped
perpetuate social stereotypes about female work “preferences.”332 As Akhil
Amar has pointed out, the tax code, rather than individual choices,
accounted for much of “[t]he great differential in wages” between married
men and married women, which easily “translate[d] into differential political
power.”333
Other legal rules that relegate women to inferior positions in the wage
market encourage, and may even compel, women to undertake disproportionately larger domestic responsibilities than husbands; such decisions in
turn reduce women’s earnings outside of marriage and reduce their
negotiating power within marriage.334 As commentators have shown, the

328
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330
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333
334

See MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 78, 110 (noting the many laws and policies that encourage gendered
division of labor); Johnson, supra note 199, at 127.
See Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Wedded to the Joint Return: Culture and the Persistence of the Marital Unit in the
American Income Tax, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 631, 631–32 (2010) (noting the minority
position of American tax law in favoring single-earner married couples over dual-earner ones).
Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (2017). This Article does not explore the change in tax
landscape in the wake of this legislation.
See COTT, supra note 113, at 223–24; EISLER, supra note 285, at 140–41; Shultz, supra note 124, at
276 (noting the system of joint marital tax returns aids traditional one-earner marriages and
penalizes dual-career couples by imposing higher taxes than if each spouse were single); Wax, supra
note 2, at 617.
See Wax, supra note 2, at 617 (citing Edward J. McCaffery, Equality of the Right Sort, 6 UCLA
WOMEN’S L.J. 289, 306–17 (1996)); Johnson, supra note 199, at 127 (“[B]y presenting women with
the option of being the overtaxed second earner, or getting social security benefits and avoiding
taxation, the code encourages women not to work outside the home.”).
Akhil Reed Amar, Women and the Constitution, 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 465, 474 n.32 (1995).
See Mary Joe Frug, Commentary, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105
HARV. L. REV. 1045, 1059–65 (1992) (discussing legal rules that encourage women to assume
disproportionate caretaking responsibilities); see also RIESSMAN, supra note 177, at 215 (cautioning
that even with the best efforts of couples, it will be difficult to sustain gender equality in marriage
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gender gap in the labor market that makes it rational for women to conform
to traditional gender roles continues to exist “partly because of gaps or
omissions in the discrimination rules, partly because of the ways in which the
rules have been interpreted, and partly because of the limited resources
allocated to discrimination law enforcement.”335 For example, Title VII has
proven an inadequate tool for challenging institutionalized work practices
that exclude women, such as time norms, no matter how arbitrary or
nonessential they may be.336 The courts’ interpretation of Title VII, one
commentator concluded, “reinforces institutionalized work practices that
push workers, both men and women, to adopt traditional gender roles at
home.”337 Moreover, courts have validated work allocation schemes that
channel far more men than women into lucrative jobs and unemployment
compensation schemes that deny benefits to women who leave work because
of childbirth.338 These legal rules all devalue female work in the wage
market, thereby providing financial incentives for women to defer to their
partners in determining the work responsibilities.
Compounding the gendered division of labor is the law’s exclusion of
domestic labor, still performed primarily by women, from the benefits and
protections accorded to other work.339 By deeming housework a labor of
love rather than a job deserving the dignity of economic return, the state
devalues women’s contributions to the family and undermines women’s
marital power.340 More importantly, the doctrine of marital services, which

335
336

337
338
339

340

without job parity); Johnson, supra note 199, at 134–35 (discussing the subservient, gendered role
that women inhabit as caretakers).
Frug, supra note 334, at 1061.
Courts have interpreted Title VII not to require employers to provide part-time or flexible work
schedules nor to require parental leave after a mother is no longer physically disabled. See Albiston,
supra note 178, at 1134, 1136–44, 1152–54 (examining in detail the doctrinal constraints Title VII
creates for unpacking the relationship between work and gender, and showing how this relationship
informs courts’ interpretation of Title VII).
Id. at 1155.
Frug, supra note 334, at 1061–62.
See, e.g., JACOB, supra note 116, at 105; MCCLAIN, supra note 2, at 100; Herma Hill Kay, “Making
Marriage and Divorce safe for Women” Revisited, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 71, 76 (2004) (noting that the
homemaking wife’s work in the home “is still not a paying job capable of both producing current
income and generating the right to retirement with an old age pension”). See generally Fineman,
supra note 180, at 2206 (noting that housewives receive neither compensation nor pension benefits
for their labor); Katharine Silbaugh, Turning Labor Into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L.
REV. 1 (1996).
See OKIN, supra note 4, at 130, 141, 150–51, 181 (arguing that the fact that women are legally forced
to perform housework for free adversely affects their power and influence within the family);
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to this day still bars interspousal contracts for domestic labor, further fosters
the economic dependence of wives by preventing them from bargaining with
their husbands for compensation for housework and child care.341 By
constructing marriage as a regime of “altruistic” exchange, the state has
systematically expropriated from women the value of a wife’s work, leading
to their economic disempowerment and decreased power in marriage.342
Relatedly, by refusing to enforce premarital contracts during the life of a
marriage, the state puts women in the position of constantly having to
renegotiate the marital bargain even though, as we have already observed,
their bargaining position tends to decline over the course of the marriage.343
The result is that women are exposed to opportunistic appropriation from
husbands and often acquiesce in disadvantageous marital arrangements.344
Without enforceable premarital contracts that cut off men’s leverage for
renegotiation, the law contributes to men’s bargaining advantage and to
women’s inferior negotiating position. Legal recognition of interspousal
contracts, as Vicky Shultz predicts, could “go far to equalize a wife’s earning
power with that of her husband,” thereby promoting greater gender equality
in the relationship.345
Legal doctrines governing marriage and its dissolution further devalue
women’s status and contributions and give husbands even more leverage to
enforce their will. First, the laws of marital naming consistently thwart
gender equality. In the past, a woman was encumbered with a legal duty to
take her husband’s surname upon marriage, signifying legal ownership by
husbands and perpetuating male dominance.346 Today, a woman is only

341

342
343
344
345
346

Margaret Sokolov, Note, Marriage Contracts for Support and Services: Constitutionality Begins at Home, 49
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1161, 1224–25 (1974).
COTT, supra note 113, at 209–10; OKIN, supra note 4, at 122; Shultz, supra note 124, at 271. For an
example, see Borelli v. Brusseau, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 16 (Ct. App. 1993). As Justice Poche in dissent
correctly called it, the court’s insistence that a husband has an entitlement to his wife’s ‘services’ for
which compensation is impossible “smack[s] of the common law doctrine of coverture.” Id. at 21
(Poche, J., dissenting).
Siegel, supra note 162, at 2208–10; Wax, supra note 2, at 526.
Wax, supra note 2, at 626–35 (“[T]he logic of disparities in bargaining power dictates that small
initial inequalities of responsibility for household work inexorably tend to snowball.”).
Id. at 628, 648–50.
Shultz, supra note 124, at 271.
Deborah J. Anthony, A Spouse By Any Other Name, 17 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 187, 201 (2010).
On the concept of surname as signifying ownership, see id. at 208, 210–11; Omi Morgenstern
Leissner, The Problem That Has No Name, 4 CARDOZO WOMEN’S L.J. 321, 358 (1998).
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socially expected to take her husband’s name,347 but a man is not allowed, in
a majority of states, to change his name to his wife’s simply by virtue of
marriage.348 In fact, only nine states explicitly allow a man to change his
name through marriage with the same ease and procedures as a woman.349
In structuring naming choices based on gender, the law continues to signal
that family identity revolves around men and that female names and
identities are secondary.350 At the same time, the law discourages men from
changing their name—a sign of ownership—as it is “virtually unthinkable in
law and policy for a man to want to be ‘owned’ in that way by his wife.”351
Second, the state still privatizes care, making the family “the private
repository of inevitable dependency”352 and assuming a gendered division of
labor in which “women’s roles typically are defined as subservient to the
whole.”353 The burdens of family care doom women, as primary caretakers,
to a life of dependency that is “socially defined and assigned, and that
assignment is gendered.”354 Meanwhile, family and welfare reforms enshrine
the image of a male head of household; the absence of a male provider is
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To this day the legal system still clings to continuing patriarchal tendencies, expecting, even if not
mandating, women to adopt their husbands’ name. For example, immigrant wives who retain their
maiden name risk that the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Service will question the validity of
their marriage. Anthony, supra note 346, at 195; see also Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing:
Framing Rules and the Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 780 (2007) (describing the state
attorney general’s opinion that a woman who wants to retain her maiden name is “odd” and
“confused”).
Anthony, supra note 346, at 190. A husband usually has to undergo a cumbersome procedure and
a court process to convince a judge to change his name. At least one court told a man attempting
to take his wife’s name that getting married was not a valid reason for the change. See id. at 202–
03.
See Anthony, supra note 346, at 204; Hannah Haksgaard, Blending Surnames at Marriage, 30 STAN. L.
& POL'Y REV. 307, 315 (2019). The most recent state to do so is California, which amended its law
in 2007, acknowledging that “the choice to adopt or not adopt a new name upon marriage . . . is a
profoundly personal reflection of one’s individuality, equality, family, community, and beliefs.”
Name Equality Act of 2007, Cal. Stat. ch. 567 (2007) (codified, as amended, at CAL. FAM. CODE §
306.5 (2020)). Only four states allow for surname blending: North Dakota, California, New York,
and Kansas. Haksgaard, supra, at 309.
Anthony, supra note 346, at 190, 213, 222 (arguing “the law reinforces unequal cultural norms and
archaic gender roles, represents and implicitly supports inequality, and violates the constitutional
principle of equal protection of the laws,” and that the marital names law “perpetuates traditional
marital gender roles and archaic notions of women as property”).
Id. at 211; Leissner, supra note 346, at 358.
Fineman, supra note 180, at 2209.
Johnson, supra note 199, at 134.
Fineman, supra note 180, at 2200.
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constructed as a social problem and its presence as a vehicle for social
policy.355 As the Shriver Report points out, “[t]oo many of our government
policies . . . are still rooted in the fundamental assumption that families
typically rely on a single breadwinner . . . .”356 In Martha Fineman's terms,
“[b]oth divorce and welfare reforms attempt to reconstitute the natural
family, by bringing the father into the picture through an economic and
disciplinary connection reminiscent of the traditional male role in the
hierarchical private family. Patriarchy is thus reasserted and modified to
meet new social realities.”357
Third, the legal rules that dictate a significant financial disparity in men’s
and women’s exit options substantially weaken women’s bargaining position
within marriage. Feminist scholars have persuasively demonstrated that
coverture has been updated rather than abolished in this context: marital
property laws that formerly failed to acknowledge women’s share in marital
tangible assets now cut women off from property rights in what is typically
the largest component of family wealth—their husband’s future income
stream—a component which women helped to produce through domestic
labor.358 By entitling a husband to exit with his income stream intact and
leaving women economically vulnerable, marital property laws considerably
enhance a husband’s already superior leverage within marriage.359 Perhaps
even more problematic for women’s marital bargaining power is the fact that
the overwhelming majority of states adhere to the “he who earns it, owns it”
rule during the life of the marriage. These states confer ownership and
management authority based on formal title to property,360 thus devaluing
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Id. at 2206–07.
MARIA SHRIVER, THE SHRIVER REPORT: A WOMAN’S NATION CHANGES EVERYTHING 76
(2009).
Fineman, supra note 180, at 2207; see also Johnson, supra note 199, at 127.
See, e.g., Williams, supra note 190, at 2251–53; Sunstein, supra note 252, at 2427; HERMA HILL KAY
& MARTHA S. WEST, TEXT, CASES AND MATERIALS ON SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 270–73
(5th ed. 2002).
Williams, supra note 190, at 2281; OKIN, supra note 4, at 167–68; Wax, supra note 2, at 549–51;
Frantz & Dagan, supra note 10, at 92 n.67 (“The asymmetric cost of divorce likely contributes to
male dominance during marriage.”).
This regime is so extreme that, even when there is a joint bank account, legal ownership of money
in the account is based largely on wage contributions. See Kelly, supra note 197, at 142–44, 157.
The nine community property states are the exception, though all but one still refuse to adopt a
joint-management regime. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR. & ANN L. ESTIN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS
CASES AND PROBLEMS 614 (7th ed. 2005); Kelly, supra note 197, at 159.
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unwaged family labor as insufficient to earn an automatic property right.361
This property regime thus plays an “influential role in power distribution
within ongoing marriage,”362 cultivating wives’ dependence on husbands by
diminishing the economic resources available to them, and perpetuating
gender hierarchy.363
Fourth, sex-neutral child custody laws that have proliferated in the last
decades have increased sex-based disparities in bargaining power within
intact marriages. As studies have shown, the prospect of having to battle
over custody and losing children further undermines what little power wives
have in marriage.364
Lastly, to this day, the state continues to enable marital violence, a groupdisadvantaging practice that denies equal citizenship to innumerable
women.365 While the law no longer officially condones wife-beating,366 it has
yet to provide sufficiently effective means to rout out domestic violence.367
The legal remedies that battered women have at their disposal, including
resources for shelter-care368 and sentencing rules for domestic abusers,369
remain grossly inadequate to enable women to escape abusive marriages.370
Moreover, whatever protections state laws purport to provide, enforcement
authorities and the court system fail to deliver, letting abusers proceed
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Kelly, supra note 197, at 145, 164.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 116–17, 146, 151, 164; see also id. at 145.
Wax, supra note 2, at 640–42; see also Carbone, supra note 227, at 60.
See the discussion supra Part II.B.2.c; see also Lela Gray, Municipal Accountability in Domestic Violence: A
Promising New Case, 4 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 362, 363 (2011).
As nineteenth century women’s rights activists grieved, “[i]n the covenant of marriage, she is
compelled to promise obedience to her husband, he becoming to all intents and purposes, her
master—the law giving him power to deprive her of her liberty, and to administer chastisement.”
See THE BIRTH OF AMERICAN FEMINISM, supra note 150, at 86–87.
Kay, supra note 339, at 87; COTT, supra note 113, at 211; Vi T. Vu, Town of Castle Rock v.
Gonzales: A Hindrance in Domestic Violence Policy Reform and Victory For the Institution of Male Dominance,
9 SCHOLAR 87, 101, 111 (2006); Claire Wright, Confronting Domestic Violence Head On: The Role of
Power in Domestic Relationships, 32 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 21, 22 (2009) (noting that “the legal system’s
treatment of domestic violence remains grossly inadequate”).
Miccio, supra note 106, at 138.
Washington State’s recent increase in sentencing for chronic domestic violence offenders in 2010 is
a notable exception. See Patricia Sully, Taking It Seriously: Repairing Domestic Violence Sentencing in
Washington State, 34 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 963 (2011).
Finley, supra note 63, at 430–31; Balos, supra note 243, at 574–75.
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uninterrupted with their abuse371 and reinforcing gender subordination and
hierarchy.372 For example, police arrest avoidance, the “pervasive lack of
enforcement”373 of civil protective orders (“CPO”), prosecutors’ tendency to
undercharge or drop the cases altogether, the notorious phenomenon of
discriminatory acquittals of battering husbands, and bias in the courts still
persist unabated.374 Many courts have further undercut the protective
capacity of CPOs, interpreting mandatory arrest statutes to allow for police
discretion to not arrest the abuser.375 This judicial accommodation of police
discretion has proven harmful to battered women and has “dramatically”
weakened CPOs as a tool for remedying and reducing domestic violence.376
Further, some judges still mistreat victims of domestic violence, trivializing
the abuse or blaming women for courting it.377 Finally, the lack of local
government and law enforcement accountability—notoriously endorsed by
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For example, the police often place domestic violence calls at the bottom of their response
hierarchy. See Miccio, supra note 106, at 130–31. For a recent case documenting how the plight of
one battered woman sheds light on just how inefficient the legal system’s treatment of battered
women is, see Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-on-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415 (2d Cir. 2009). See
also Gray, supra note 365, at 365 (reporting “an overall inadequate police response” to domestic
violence).
Balos, supra note 243, at 574–75; Tetlow, supra note 243, at 90, 95; Bethany A. Corbin, Goodbye Earl:
Domestic Abusers and Guns in the Wake of United States v. Castleman—Can the Supreme Court Save Domestic
Violence Victims, 94 NEB. L. REV. 101, 104–96 (2015) (stating that despite the prevalence and
brutality of abuse, abusers “are typically only charged with misdemeanors—if they are charged at
all”).
Vu, supra note 367, at 88.
Miccio, supra note 106, at 138; Vu, supra note 367, at 113 (noting that many male police officers fail
to respond to protective order calls due to gender bias). See generally Tetlow, supra note 243, at 77;
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the Supreme Court378—“operat[es] as state condonation of domestic
violence.”379
In response to state governments’ failure to provide adequate remedies
for gender-based violence,380 and cognizant of the profound link between
violence against women and women’s equality,381 Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act. The Supreme Court, however, invalidated
the legislation,382 in a decision regarded by Catharine MacKinnon as a
“substantive victory for the social institution of male dominance.”383
Even more strikingly, twenty-six states have retained, in some form, the
common-law notion of marital rape as a “definitional impossibility.”384
Many states either provide spousal exemptions or immunity for various nonconsensual sexual offenses other than forcible rape, subject marital rape to
less serious sanctions than non-marital rape, or impose diverse procedural
hurdles for prosecution, among them the requirement that marital rape may
be prosecuted only if a couple was legally separated or divorced at the time
of the assault.385 The state’s refusal to interfere in marriages involving sexual
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Miccio, supra note 106, at 134; see also id. at 133–34 (“[accountability] failures contribute to
continuation of the violence.”). See generally Gray, supra note 365, at 364.
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virtually all commentators note the dearth of prosecutions and convictions on marital rape charges.
For a review of the literature on these points, see Shultz, supra note 124, at 277–78; Anderson, supra
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violence—effectively treating the marriage license as a sexual license as
well—facilitates the domestic abuse of wives by husbands and strengthens
wifely subordination.386
Having helped in crucial ways to produce or reinforce sexual imbalances
in marital power and to embed, perhaps indelibly, sexist assumptions about
the respective roles of men and women in and outside the home, the state
cannot disclaim any role in the gender hierarchy that continues to
characterize most marriages.387 Today’s statutory rules and doctrines, at
both the state and federal levels, along with the deeply gendered common
law of centuries past, help cement the institution of marriage as it is currently
structured and lived as a major obstacle to women’s equality. To this day,
marriages continue to feature a gender-based division of labor, grossly
asymmetrical relations of power, economic vulnerability, domestic violence,
and sexual exploitation. Certainly, women are not pressured to stay at home
anymore, and most of them join their husbands in financially supporting the
family. Yet, when they return home from the market, they are still
expected—and typically have little bargaining strength to resist—to fulfill all
of the wife’s traditional domestic and caretaking tasks and to compromise
their workforce participation whenever it conflicts with the needs of their
family.
The work that wives do at home to enable men’s occupational and
financial successes remains uncounted, unrecognized, and undervalued,
undermining women’s opportunities to achieve economic independence.
That gendered division of labor is duplicated in the marketplace, where
women are treated as marginal workers and men as the “ideal workers”388
who are expected to enjoy the domestic services of their spouses. The
economic subordination of women in the workplace in turn increases their
dependency on husbands, limits female bargaining power in marriage, and
further aggravates private patriarchy in the home.
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1185, 1204 n.124 (1992).
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Press, U.S.A. 2001).
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By so doing, marital inequality produces a vicious cycle that reinforces
the dominance of men over women, from home to work and back home
again, and impedes women’s progress toward full citizenship stature. That
feedback mechanism may seriously disrupt women’s lives and careers,
frustrate their acquisition and development of human capital and labor skills,
and generally make it less likely that they will be able to be equals in
legislatures, judiciaries, and other positions of power. In this way, marriage
not only differentiates women’s and men’s roles in society, but also
contributes to the perpetuation of a caste-like system in which women as a
group suffer from inferior social status, lesser political and economic power,
and even physical vulnerability.389
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that barriers on exit that lock women into
marriages in which abuse may reign and sex roles are rigidly assigned are a
form of state action that inflicts dignitary and status harms on women by
limiting their prospects and channeling them into circumscribed lives.
Divorce-restrictive regulations perpetuate women’s social and economic
inferiority, ensure that they live under the sovereignty of their husbands, and
make it more difficult for women to participate as citizens on equal terms
with men. Moreover, these regulations compel women to stay wives, while
in no respect alleviating—and in some ways exacerbating—the conditions
that make marriage a principal cause of female oppression. A unilateral right
to a readily available marital exit is therefore indispensable if we are to
alleviate gender stratification, release women from subordination and
entrenched gender role expectations, prepare them to pursue roles that bring
external valuation and recognition, and bolster their self-esteem, identity,
and self-governance.
In the final analysis, then, probing what marriage has meant for women
and their status in society exposes the gendered power in a facially neutral
dissolution regime and provides solid constitutional anchors for the right to
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divorce under all substantive visions of gender equality. This is true whether
one uses the anti-subordination principle, the historical interpretations of
equal protection, or the Supreme Court’s emerging doctrine of “due process
equality.” This Article’s companion390 will further establish marital freedom
as a formal gender equality right by applying the antidiscrimination principle
to the divorce context. All in all, marital freedom is thus not simply a legal
remedy for broken marriages, but a critical component for a social order
committed to securing equal citizenship and human dignity for all women.
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